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Abstract
Ineffective corporate governance is a leading cause of financial crises. Ineffectual
corporate governance is mainly due to the lack of prudential and efficient supervision,
which is symptomatic of board composition and the selection criteria of board members.
The purpose of this single case study was to explore the strategies that banking leaders
used to identify board selection criteria that ensures effective governance. The sample
consisted of 4 business leaders at a bank located in California that remained profitable
and did not have losses during the recent recession. The conceptual framework used for
the study was agency theory. The data sources were publicly available archival
documents, semistructured interviews, member checking, and extant literature on the
topic. Using methodological triangulation, 4 themes emerged from data analysis: select
independent, experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members;
recognize the importance of the choice of the CEO and other senior executives;
acknowledge cooperation is key to sustainable growth; and promote integrity and ethics
as key executive and board membership criteria. The application of the findings in this
study may contribute to social change when banks operate under effective governance
that can lead to improved well-being for all corporate stakeholders, including investors,
employees, customers, and the bank’s community, through the continued employment
and the economic stability of the community.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Ineffective corporate governance was the primary cause in well-publicized
instances of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial sector that led to the
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century (2007–2009), further adding to
uncertainty about boards’ ability for oversight (McNulty, Florakis, & Ormrod, 2013).
Effective monitoring is the ability (a) to be objective, (b) to comprehend the issues at
hand, (c) to devote requisite time plus attention, and (d) to exert an individual’s self on
behalf of shareholders (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2014). The common cause of the
subprime mortgage crisis and a resulting housing market crash was weak oversight,
which led to excessive risk-taking and created incentives for banks to maximize shortterm profits by pushing subprime lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013).
Ineffective corporate governance manifests beyond the most recent financial crisis
despite various governance factors and preventing practices; a typical organization loses
about 5% of revenue each year to various forms of malfeasance (Yu, 2013). Malfeasance
ranges from (a) the inadequacy of internal controls and lack of oversight, (b) fraudulent
earnings reports, and (c) wrong action or inaction by executives and boards (Soltani,
2014). Contemporary corporate governance issues include (a) inadequate information
safety protocols leading to the breach of privacy data (Rai & Mar, 2014), (b) management
of strategic partnerships (Thorne & Quinn, 2016) with prevention, and (c) management of
corporate crises (Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Startling, 2014).
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Background of the Problem
Ineffective corporate governance was the primary cause in well-publicized
instances of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial sector that led to the
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century (2007-2009) further adding to
uncertainty about boards’ ability for oversight (McNulty, Florakis, & Ormrod, 2013).
Effective monitoring is the ability, (a) to be objective, (b) to comprehend the issues at
hand, (c) to devote requisite time plus attention, and (d) to exert one’s self on behalf of
shareholders (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2014). The common cause of the subprime
mortgage crisis and a resulting housing market crash was weak oversight, which led to
excessive risk-taking and created incentives for banks to maximize short-term profits by
pushing subprime lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013).
Ineffective corporate governance manifests beyond the most recent financial crisis
despite various governance factors and preventing practices; a typical organization loses
about 5% of revenue each year to various forms of malfeasance (Yu, 2013). Malfeasance
ranges from (a) the inadequacy of internal controls and lack of oversight, (b) fraudulent
earnings reports and (c) wrong action or inaction by executives and boards (Soltani,
2014). Contemporary corporate governance issues include (a) inadequate information
safety protocols leading to the breach of privacy data (Rai & Mar, 2014), (b) management
of strategic partnerships (Thorne & Quinn, 2016), with prevention, and (c) management
of corporate crises (Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Startling, 2014).
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Problem Statement
Corporate governance is a crucial success factor in a firm’s strategy and financial
performance (Volonte, 2015), and when corporations' governance policies are weakly
enforced, organizations can become inefficient and unprofitable (Starbuck, 2014).
Corporate governance became a familiar term with the financial scandals and an
exponential increase in corporate earnings restatements between 1997 and 2002, when
financial markets lost more than $100 billion in market capitalization due to ineffective
governance issues (Mande & Myungsoo, 2013). The general business problem was that
some banking institutions lacked effective governance. The specific business problem
was that some banking leaders lack strategies to identify board selection criteria that
promote effective governance.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective
governance. The targeted population comprised of banking leaders in one U.S. bank who
demonstrated governance procedures for selecting board members and effective
governance that ensured that the bank did not experience failures or government bailouts
during the last financial crisis (2007–2009). The findings from this doctoral study have
implications for positive social change, including economic and social benefits through
profitable corporations to stakeholders, communities, and the economy. The social
benefits could include enhancing self-worth when individuals remain employed in
solvent corporations and promoting stable thriving families and communities.
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Nature of the Study
A qualitative approach was appropriate for this research study. Qualitative
methods are appropriate for describing, decoding, and advancing the understanding of
intertwined past, present, or future eclectic data (Hlady-Rispal & Jouison-Laffitte, 2014).
Qualitative methods with open-ended research questions are appropriate for gathering
comprehensive responses, identifying, and understanding different perspectives (Starr,
2014). Therefore, a qualitative method was suitable for studying effective corporate
governance. An alternative research method that I could have chosen was the quantitative
research method, which is useful for examining relationships and differences among
variables and testing hypotheses (see Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). A quantitative
method was not suitable, as I did not focus this study on testing hypotheses or examining
the relationships or differences among variables. Another possible method is mixed
method research, which is an approach in which a researcher combines quantitative and
qualitative methods in the same research inquiry (Starr, 2014). A mixed method is a
viable option when a research question is multifaceted and complex and the researcher
cannot address the problem by one approach adequately (Caruth, 2013). However,
because semistructured interview questions are best for answering the research question
in this study with comprehensive responses (see Dresch, Lacerda, & Cauchick Miguel,
2015), I employed the qualitative method.
I conducted a single case study to address the purpose of this research. Qualitative
case studies involve the study of a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting
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(Yin, 2014). Therefore, a case study was appropriate for understanding corporate
governance issues from the participants’ ideas and perspectives.
There are several qualitative research designs, including phenomenology,
ethnography, and case studies. The phenomenological approach involves collecting the
lived experiences of individuals with particular characteristics who have experienced a
common phenomenon (Ryan, Lauchlan, Rooney, Hollins Martins, & Gray, 2014). The
focus of this study was on efficacious strategies and processes for selecting board
members; hence, phenomenology would not have been an appropriate design. In
ethnographical research, the researcher is an active and engaged participant who observes
and describes the attributes of a culture-sharing group (Lopez-Dicastillo & Belintxon,
2014). An ethnography would be unsuitable to studying utilizing corporate governance
because it does not involve exploring a cultural phenomenon. As both phenomenology
and ethnography were unsuitable designs for this study, the case study design was the
most appropriate to address the research question.
Research Question
I developed one overarching research question to guide this study: What strategies
do banking leaders use to identify board selection criteria to ensure effective governance?
Interview Questions
I used the following semistructured interview questions to promote exploration of
corporate governance from the perspective of business leaders in one U.S. bank that
demonstrated effective corporate governance and did not experience failures or
government bailouts during the last financial crisis.
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1. What are the functions of your board of directors?
2. What are the characteristics of an effective corporate board?
3. What are your board selection criteria?
4. What is the bank’s process for selecting and appointing board members?
5. How has your board demonstrated effective corporate governance?
6. In what ways have your selection criteria demonstrated that they promote
effective board members?
7. What are other selection strategies that you have used for promoting effective
corporate governance?
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for this study was agency theory. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) developed agency theory to explain the inherent conflict of interest between
executives and corporate board members. Key propositions of the theory involve conflict
in corporate leadership characterized by the short-term profit orientation of some CEOs,
versus the long-term viability strategies of the corporation (Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Such
conflict is more prevalent when there is a dichotomy in the strategies required for shortterm and long-term success and when the CEO role is combined with the chair of the
board of directors (Sarpal, 2014).
In agency theory, the interests of the CEO and shareholders sometimes diverge
(e.g., maximizing short term results versus engaging in long term strategies), which can
result in significant costs and inefficiencies ultimately borne by society (Bosse &
Phillips, 2016). The central premise of agency theory is that managers and shareholders
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have different access to firm-specific information, and managers as agents of
shareholders/principals sometimes engage in self-serving behavior by making unethical
or illegal decisions that may be detrimental to long-term corporate interests (Filatotchev
& Nakajima, 2014). Executive largess, ineffective boards, distorted incentive schemes,
accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management
behavior, and lack of adequate oversight have been major causes of corporate
malfeasance (Soltani, 2014).
Krause and Semadeni (2014) noted that a key proposition of agency theory is that
the CEO and board chair roles should be separated, because the CEO acting as his or her
own monitor creates a conflict of interest. Remediating the agency conflict is a primary
corporate governance issue. Sur et al. (2013) concluded that the composition of a board
affects its functionality. A key agency theory premise is that diversity and board
members’ independence from management is an important requirement for controlling
management and protecting shareholder value (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, & Labelle,
2013). Hambrick et al. (2014) proposed to improve the monitoring capabilities of boards
by increasing the proportion of independent directors, customarily defined as those who
are not current or former company employees or otherwise linked to the company or its
managers.
Operational Definitions
CEO duality: The assignment of CEO and board chair roles to one individual
(Krause & Semadeni, 2014).
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Groupthink: A psychological phenomenon that arises when a group of people
cares more about avoiding conflict with each other than they do about the quality of the
decision they are making (Carver, 2013).
Incentive contract: The attachment of performance targets to equity grants (such
as stock options) to strengthen the association between executive compensation and firm
performance (Abernethy, Yu Flora, & Bo, 2015).
Leverage: The debt to equity ratio calculated as long-term debt divided by total
equity at the beginning of the year (Malshe & Agarwal, 2015).
Market capitalization: The valuation of a corporation based on the price of its
shares and stocks. Market capitalization is a proxy for stock market quality (Hartono &
Sulistiawan, 2014).
Poison pill: The board of directors adopts poison pills, which are issued as a
dividend to shareholders of common stock that is triggered when a potential acquirer
accumulates a specified percentage of a target firm’s outstanding shares. The pill makes it
difficult for the potential acquirer to complete a hostile takeover since it substantially
increases the amount that the potential acquirer needs to pay (Rhee & Fiss, 2014).
Risk: The probability of occurrence and the associated consequences of a set of
hazardous scenarios (Gardoni & Murphy, 2014).
Strategic agility: The ability of a company to adapt to the changes in the business
environment or influence the environment; this ability determines its success in gaining
competitive advantage or even survival in the contemporary business environment
(Mavengere, 2013).
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions are facts considered valid without additional investigation (Jansson,
2013). The following assumptions were necessary for me to explore participants’
perceptions of board selection criteria and strategies that business leaders use to ensure
effective governance. One assumption I held was that bank boards are critical to effective
corporate governance. Another assumption was that the composition and attributes of
bank boards are essential to the board’s effectiveness. I also assumed that the participants
in this study were knowledgeable about the subject under study and were forthright and
honest in the responses given to the interview questions.
Limitations
Limitations of a study are the factors that are beyond the control of the researcher
(Greene et al., 2013). The results of this study were limited by the honesty of the
participants in discussing the board selection criteria of their bank. Another limitation
was the degree of forthrightness and candor of my participants in identifying and
discussing all the effective corporate governance practices and strategies that have been
critical to preventing corporate crises and resulting in the success of the bank. Banks are
different in size, customer base, location, and market capitalization; the particular bank
that I selected for my single case study may not be representative of all types of banks.
Delimitations
Delimitations refer to the bounds or scope of the study as defined by the
researcher (Yin, 2014). Delimitations are boundaries that researchers establish before
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commencing a study (Mitchell & Jolley, 2014). Corporate governance is a broad area of
research that may have unduly widened the scope of this study beyond the business
problem. This study was delimited to corporate governance in strategy formulation and
execution. I chose a specific community bank located in the state of California in the
United States with board selection criteria that promoted effective governance.
I delimited this study to four participants who were knowledgeable about the
bank’s successful board selection criteria. The participants included board members,
selection committee members of the bank, and bank leaders who had been associated
with the bank for at least 3 years. I selected only participants who had knowledge of the
selection criteria for board members for the bank. The interview questions and the study
were delimited to board selection criteria that are essential for effective corporate
governance.
Significance of the Study
Sustainable success for many corporations results largely from decision-making
and strategic corporate action by the CEO and the board of directors (Mowbray & Ingley,
2013). Sustainable success may benefit corporate stakeholders, including investors,
employees, customers, and the bank’s community. The potential significance of the
findings from my study is that they may positively contribute to business practices that
promote positive corporate banks financial performance and foster effective CEO-level
governance.
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Contribution to Business Practice
My recommendations from this study may be of value in determining board
selection criteria that promote effective governance. Board composition that promotes
effective governance could add significant shareholder value. Effective corporate
governance is a determinant of investment decisions for many investors, including
institutional investors with large portfolios in that good governance enables these
institutions to protect their investments (Bushee, Carter, & Gerakos, 2014). The financial
success of large or middle-size businesses and banks may result in economic growth and
stability. The major contribution of this study for business practices is that of identifying
and proposing board member selection criteria that may improve corporate governance,
which could result in better business practices and performance.
Implications for Social Change
The findings from this study may encourage business leaders to adopt board
selection strategies that promote corporate governance. Effective corporate governance
strategies may lead to long-term shareholder value maximization and protect all
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and society as a whole
(Bistrova, Titko, & Lace, 2014). The implications of this study for positive social change
may include promoting improved individual welfare and living standards for all corporate
stakeholders.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
My goal in undertaking this study was to explore board selection criteria and
strategies that business leaders use to ensure effective governance. This review of
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professional and academic literature pertained to corporate governance, strategic
management, outstanding board member attributes, and board selection criteria. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2013) estimated the costs associated with the
financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century at $10 trillion and attributed the
cause to a lack of prudential supervision. Corporate governance involves a set of
relationships among executives of a company, its board, its shareholders, other
stakeholders, and the structure for achieving the objectives of the company (Dermine,
2013). This review will be composed of five sections: (a) conceptual framework, (b)
history of corporate governance problem, (c) governance initiatives and strategies, (d)
current corporate governance challenges, and (e) board selection criteria.
There is a wealth of information on corporate governance and board selection in
journals, academic papers, essays, conference papers, texts, and books. I found articles on
the composition of the boards, regulatory reforms, independent auditors, ethics, CEO
requirements, executive compensation, and the role of discretion. I undertook a
comprehensive and iterative search using the following key words and phrases: corporate
governance, board of directors, strategic management, cyber security, strategic
partnerships, corporate crisis, and corporate malfeasance. My literature search
incorporated five databases: EBSCOhost, Business Source Complete, Hoover’s by Dun
& Bradstreet, ABI/Inform, and ProQuest. I also sought information from several
professional publications, print media, commercial, and government websites.
My research strategy was to target relevant literature concerning corporate
governance in academic journals. The primary sources of reviewed articles were from
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scholarly articles. My search of databases and relevant items yielded a literature review
that includes 190 sources, including four books and articles from 174 peer-reviewed
journals, 165 of which were published within 5 years of the reference year of 2017. These
165 sources represent 87% of the total sources reviewed, meeting the requirements of
Walden University that at least 85% of literature review references being recent and peerreviewed items.
Conceptual Framework
Agency theory. Agency theory served as the conceptual framework for this
doctoral study on effective corporate governance. According to agency theory, corporate
governance involves two parties: the agent, typically the owners or executives who
makes decisions, and the principals, who are shareholders of the organization (Conheady,
McIlkenny, Opong, & Pignatel, 2015). Principals rely on the agent to act on their behalf;
they expect company leaders to make competent decisions for the long-term profitability
of the company (Berle & Means, 1991). Problems arise when the agent makes decisions
that do not benefit the principals; from the principals’ perspective, these decisions benefit
the agent’s own utility to the detriment of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The
divergence of interests are principal-agent problems, or simply, agency problems (Bosse
& Phillips, 2016). Principal-agent or agency problems tend to spur shareholder calls for
active boards to implement effective governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Corporate boards are expected to follow corporate governance mechanisms and
are responsible for protecting shareholder interests and mitigating agency conflicts
between shareholders and management (Sengupta & Zhang, 2015). Corporate
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governance is a set of organizational practices designed to mitigate agency problems
(Moradi, Aldin, Heyrani, & Iranmahd, 2012). Members of the board engage in corporate
governance through the monitoring of executive activities, restraining managerial
discretion, aligning CEO interests with those of the board and shareholders, and
contributing to long-term shareholder value (Moradi et al., 2012).
The primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance and act in
shareholders’ best interests by delivering a real return on investment (Crespi-Cladera &
Pascual-Fuster, 2014). Improvements in governance reduce the likelihood of default and
the cost of debt, enhancing financial performance (Frantz & Instefjord, 2013). Members
of the board should be engaged in mitigating agency issues, which may include limiting
the CEO’s activity and ability to make unilateral decisions (Crespi-Cladera & PascualFuster, 2014).
Corporations that have extensive agency problems tend to have heavily-polarized
boards and voting blocs of shareholders (Ayuso, Rodriguez, Garcia-Castro, & Arino,
2014). Members of voting blocs may hold meetings independent of the board and
company executives with the objective of making collective decisions that run counter to
those of the board and CEO (Zhu, 2013). To remediate agency problems, researchers,
such as Alexander, Bauguess, Bernile, Lee, and Marietta-Westberg (2013) and Mitra,
Jaggi, and Hassain (2013), have recommended putting in place a strong and active audit
committee. These audit committees are composed of board members who represent
independence, diversity, financial knowledge, and vigilance (Krause, Semadeni, &
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Cannella, 2013). Board members with these characteristics promote effective governance
(Krause et al., 2013).
The purpose of having a board of directors in place in an organization is to
remediate agency problems and champion shareholders’ interests (Sur et al., 2013). An
active audit committee enhances transparency and uncovers discrepancies (Krause et al.,
2013). Del Brio, Yoshikawa, Connelly, and Tan’s (2013) conclusions that board
members must be qualified and capable of undertaking the tasks of monitoring
executives’ corporate decisions and allocating resources strategically based on sound
fiscal assessments are in line with Krause et al.’s (2013) findings. According to Jensen
and Meckling (1976), company executives and board members who adopt the tenets of
agency theory follow sound governance strategies and realize strong financial results.
Shareholders benefit from active boards that establish corporate fiscal balance,
govern fairly, and disclose information fully and honestly (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014).
Information asymmetry is a central problem that boards may remedy using agency theory
(Tian, 2014). Information asymmetry is the imbalance in insight into firm strategies,
challenges, operations, and critical issues that occur when managers, and not absentee
owners, are in-charge of an organization (Conheady et al., 2015). When information
asymmetry occurs, the board of directors should put in place the mechanisms for
reducing or eliminating such information asymmetries to ensure shareholder confidence
in the board (Conheady et al., 2015).
The information is asymmetrical or unbalanced, as a typical CEO would have
more internal firm knowledge than the shareholders (Conheady et al., 2015). Srinidhi,
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Shaohua, and Firth (2014) wrote that board governance is a mechanism that alleviates
agency problems and information asymmetry with reporting and disclosure. All leaders
involved in corporate financial reporting, internal control, and corporate governance
(boards of directors and audit committees) need to be alert to warning signs such as audit
issues, financial restatements, elevated risk, and lack of disclosure (Franzel, 2014). The
leaders, board of directors, and audit committees must respond appropriately to maintain
integrity and the public trust as failure could threaten capital markets and economic wellbeing (Franzel, 2014).
Well-governed corporations have boards that are accountable, both fiscally and
morally, to shareholders (Nohel, Guo, & Kruse, 2014). Economists attribute the global
financial crisis that began in 2007 to the financial services and banking industry
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015), largely because these organizations did not have boards
that were accountable to shareholders. Responsible boards of directors take ownership of
their role and actively oversee the activities of their firms (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013).
Many previous fiscal crises, whether within individual organizations or in industries as a
whole, resulted from a lack of prudent supervision at the board level (GAO, 2013). From
the perspective of agency theory, the board of directors’ accountability to shareholders
includes monitoring managerial opportunism and the potential exploitation of minority
shareholders by majority shareholders (Berle & Means, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Not all boards of directors are independent outsiders (Hambrick et al., 2014).
Board members can be internal members who are executives or employees of the
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organization, or they can be external members who are not employees of the firm and are
not under the control of the CEO (Hambrick et al., 2014). External or independent board
members are appointed to be independent of the CEO (Crespi-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster,
2014). Their appointments are based on their personal and professional qualities, which
place them in a position to perform their duties without being influenced by any
connection with the company, its shareholders, or its management (Crespi-Cladera &
Pascual-Fuster, 2014).
Investors prefer to invest in organizations with independent boards because these
boards monitor executives, even if there is no definitive evidence of a positive association
between board independence and firm performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Al-Najjar (2014) found a positive relationship between
board of director independence, firm performance, and stock performance. According to
agency theory, independent or outside board members act as monitors of company
executives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), reducing executives’ abilities to act
opportunistically and in their own best interest. In contrast, stewardship theory, when
applied at the level of board members and CEO, creates synergies that positively
influence organizational performance through collaboration within the mechanisms of
trust, confidence, and strategic decision making (Mowbray & Ingley, 2013). Stewardship
theory focuses on managerial and board members behavior and states that the behavior is
pro-organizational and that the key motivating factor for managers and board members is
getting satisfaction from a job well done (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015).
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Board member duties include giving counsel to executives and maintaining civil,
arm’s length relationships between the board and management (Zhang, 2013). Their
control tasks involve monitoring and evaluating company and CEO performance to
ensure corporate growth and protection of shareholders’ interest (Zhang, 2013). Board
members must balance their duties of monitoring and giving counsel, being vigilant to
ensure that quality of governance remains at the forefront of their attention so that
investors’ interests are protected and public interests are safeguarded (Franzel, 2014).
Board members have a responsibility to the organization to maintain confidential
information to which they might be privy but also to filing honest, accurate, and complete
reports (Kim & Ozdemir, 2014). Ramanan (2014) opined that having internal board
members as opposed to external board members increases reporting integrity and that
strong board oversight leads to, rather than inhibits, distorted reporting. Good corporate
governance should incentivize the board members and executives to pursue objectives
that benefit both the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective
monitoring (Dermine, 2013). According to agency theory, candidates for board
membership should be selected based on their ability to monitor management; because
they are expected to monitor and guide executives, their independence from these
executives is paramount (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Although scholars such as Al-Najjar (2014) and Crespi-Cladera and PascualFuster (2014) have expressed a preference for independent directors, Minton, Taillard,
and Williamson (2014) advocated against them. Minton et al. claimed that independent
directors with financial expertise encouraged the increased risk-taking behavior of
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banking executives before the global financial crisis. According to Minton et al., an
independent board with financial expertise was strongly negatively associated with bank
performance during the crisis. The corporate governance model for banks relies on
independent directors to ensure shareholders’ interests fuel decisions and steer executives
away from conflicts (Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). Bushee et al. (2014) contended that
investors prefer independent boards because their presence signals effective governance.
In some firms, the CEO is also the chair of the board, while in other firms, the
roles are kept separate and occupied by different persons. Agency theorists claim greater
degrees of board independence result from the roles of CEO and chair of the board being
distinct and separate—in other words, in organizations where CEO duality is not
practiced (Sarpal, 2014). Regulators support organizations in which CEO duality is not
practiced (Sarpal, 2014), and there are higher volumes of trade and higher earnings in
firms with independent boards (Bar-Yosef & Prencipe, 2013). Although Sarpal (2014)
was not in favor of CEO duality, some scholars have approved of the approach. For
example, Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and Ryan (2014) claimed that the flow of information
from the CEO to the board benefits from CEO duality.
For public corporations in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (2010) and Securities and Exchange Commission rules
mandate that boards inform shareholders about the board leadership structure and provide
reasons for combining the roles of chair and CEO (GAO, 2013). Firms with independent
chairs, majority voting, and a history of detailed disclosure of voting results in director
elections tend to have a higher firm value (Tobin’s Q) or performance (return on assets
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and stock returns) and lower financial risk (Baulkaran, 2014). The practice of splitting the
roles of CEO and chairman or CEO and president in public corporations is becoming
increasingly common in the United States, whether on a voluntary or a mandatory basis,
to enhance corporate independence and transparency (Abels & Martelli, 2013). This
increased separation of CEOs from board chairs has occurred alongside governance
experts’ insistence that the separate leadership structure represents best practice for
boards of directors (Krause et al., 2014).
Board sizes vary among corporations. Boards with fewer than 10 members are
regarded as small and boards with more than 10 members are considered large
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). According to agency theory, a large board can be less
efficient than a small board because of an increase in agency conflicts, inefficient
communication, and operation costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Threshold analysis
reveals that, following the financial crisis of the first decade of the 21st century, most
investment banks opted for boards with fewer than 10 members, aiming to decrease
agency conflicts from which predecessor large boards suffered (Mamatzakis & Bermpei,
2015). The resource dependency theory proposes that large boards are beneficial to firms
because large boards are more diversified than small boards, and diversified board
members provide greater expertise, wider access to resources, and higher quality advice
than small boards (Switzer & Wang, 2013). While resource dependency theory favors
large boards, agency theory suggests that large boards are not efficient because they are
rife with coordination and communication problems and internal conflicts among
directors (Switzer & Wang, 2013).
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Several factors are associated with ineffective board decision making including
size of boards (larger boards are more ineffective than smaller boards), board
composition, the lack of specific industry expertise, and inadequate time commitment by
directors (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). While some scholars believe that board size has
a negative impact on performance, consistent with the agency theory, particularly for
banks with boards composed of more than 10 members (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015),
Switzer and Wang (2013) found that large board size and less busy directors are
associated with lower credit risk levels, but may not result in effective governance.
Regardless of the board size, the attributes and capabilities of each board member are
important to its functioning and effectiveness (Franzel, 2014).
There are many other governance theories that apply to corporations. The various
theories of corporate governance are polarized between a shareholder perspective and a
stakeholder orientation (Ayuso et al., 2014). At one extreme, governance focuses
exclusively on shareholders, while the other largely neglects financial and market
performance interests of the firm (Ayuso et al., 2014).
Stewardship theory. In addition to the popular agency theory, there are a number
of other corporate governance theories. Stewardship theory is a contrasting concept to
agency theory. According to stewardship theory, agents or CEOs are less likely to base
their actions on self-interest and base them instead on serving the goals of the collective;
in these cases, agents or CEOs act as stewards of the interests of their principals or
shareholders (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
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The premise of stewardship theory is that managers left to their own devices will
act as responsible stewards of the assets they control; the executive and board work
cooperatively toward sustainable organization goals (Schillemans, 2013). Under
stewardship theory, the board is expected to work openly and collaboratively with the
CEO; the relationship between the two parties is trusting and cooperative rather than
adversarial (McNulty et al., 2013). The key constructs underlying stewardship theory are
that the board and management (a) have trust, (b) have mutual interests, (c) derive
motivation from satisfaction in doing a good job, (d) value pro-organization behaviors,
and (e) have no conflict (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015).
In contrast to agency theory, the relationship between board and management,
according to stewardship theory, is based on trust and working cooperatively on the same
objectives (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In stewardship theory, financial factors are not
the key motivators for employees, but in agency theory, the work motivators are
predominantly financial (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). The stewardship theory’s
philosophy is based on McGregor’s Theory Y while the agency theory’s philosophy is
based on McGregor’s Theory X (Glinkowska & Kaczwarek, 2015). As a result of trust, a
CEO engenders unity in direction, command, and control when he or she also serves as
the chair of the board of directors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is yet another governance theory.
Freeman developed the theory in 1994. This theory explains that corporations exist to
represent the interests of different but interrelated stakeholders, all of which deserve
strategic consideration (Moriarty, 2014). Stakeholders include (a) employees, (b)
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managers, (c) shareholders, (d) financiers, (e) customers, (f) suppliers also communities,
(g) special interest or environmental groups, (h) the media, and (i) society as a whole
(Harrison, Freeman, & Sa de Abreau, 2015). The proposition is that corporations derive
value through the consideration of all stakeholders and not just the consideration of
shareholders (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).
There are arguments supporting the utility of stakeholder theory. Bridoux and
Stoelhorst (2013) concluded that organizations demonstrate improved firm performance
when fairness is applied toward all stakeholders. Organizations in which stakeholder
principles are upheld are likely to have strong stakeholder support and participation
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013). Following stakeholder precepts is associated with good
management and higher financial performance (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014).
Stakeholder theory advocates for treating all stakeholders with fairness, honesty,
and even generosity (Harrison et al., 2015). Stakeholder theorists propose that treating all
stakeholders well creates a synergy (Tantalo & Priem, 2014). Moriarty (2014) stated
stakeholder democracy was better for realizing the distributive goal of stakeholder theory,
which is to balance all stakeholders’ interests, rather than the standard corporate
governance arrangement that involves control of the board exclusively by shareholders.
Trusteeship theory. Trusteeship theory (Balasubramanian, 2009) is another
corporate governance theory. This model of governance promotes wealth creation, but is
sensitive to the needs of society as a whole (Balasubramanian, 2009). According to
trusteeship theory, the executive and board are keepers and trustees of the corporation,
and with mounting public pressure arising from corporate governance scandals and
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environmental concerns, the concept of the responsibility of companies is changing and
broader corporate governance guidelines are gradually emerging (Pande & Ansari, 2014).
Under trusteeship theory, the CEO, executive management, and board members
behave transparently and conscientiously and act in the best interest of all shareholders
and other stakeholders (Balasubramanian, 2009). The scale and magnitude of corporate
frauds and scams in the 21st century in name of profit represented the absence of
truteeship (Pande & Ansari, 2014). Societal trusteeship is fundamentally oriented toward
the needs of external society and is represented by a willingness to leverage institutional
resources to improve the human condition (Palmer, 2013).
Trusteeship theory extends beyond stakeholder theory in that it addresses societal
expectations and defines the role and responsibility of the organization to the social
environment as a whole (Balasubramanian, 2009). Of particular concern in trusteeship
theory is the wellbeing of those sections of the society that are disadvantaged (Pande &
Ansari, 2014). The agency of trustees and greater diversity among trustees adds to the
organization in terms of dynamism, creativity, innovation, boardroom decision-making
processes, and quality of decisions (Sayce & Ozbilgin, 2014). Trusteeship theory is an
ambitious concept along the lines of Utopian; achieving it requires a transformational
change in people (Pande & Ansari, 2014).
Summary. Agency theory was the appropriate conceptual framework for this
doctoral study on utilizing corporate governance in strategy formulation and execution as
it is focused on strengthening corporate governance. Other governance theories such as
stewardship theory, (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994), and
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trusteeship theory (Balasubramanian, 2009), depend on the premise that the collective
interests of the CEO and shareholders are aligned. These theories assume the cooperative
effort of the groups without the need to monitor executive activities. The lack of
prudential supervision was the chief cause of corporate crises (GAO, 2013). Agency
theory promotes the monitoring of managerial performance (Crespi-Cladera & PascualFuster, 2014), protects shareholder interests (Sengupta & Zhang, 2015), restrains
discretion, aligns CEO interests with board and shareholders’ interests, and; therefore,
contributes to long-term shareholder value (Moradi et al., 2012).
History of Corporate Governance Problem
Many financial crises have affected the economy of the United States. One such
notable financial crisis occurred in the 20st century: the U.S. savings and loan crisis of
the 1980s. Corporate governance history can be traced to the savings and loan crisis in
which many financial institutions failed (Docking, 2012). More than 1,000 commercial
banks and 939 savings and loans failed from 1980 through 1989 due to lax regulations,
supervision, enforcement, and weak governance (Docking, 2012).
Financial crises were not unique to the 20th century. Banking crises in the 21st
century included the dot-com bubble crisis from 1997 to 2003 during which market
euphoria propelled the stocks of technology firms beyond their market capitalization
(Leone, Rice, Weber, & Willenborg, 2013). In essence, firms that had not declared profit
earned a speculative valuation (Leone et al., 2013). Initial public offerings of many
Internet companies received backing by venture capital firms and were underwritten by
prestigious investment banks (Leone et al., 2013). In retrospect, the behavior of the
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venture capitalists and investment bankers is nothing short of a failure in corporate
governance (Leone et al., 2013).
Accounting scandals and corporate governance failures increased in the early
2000s (Henderson, 2013). WorldCom overstated its profits by $3.8 billion by improperly
classifying expenses as investments (Darrat, Gray, Park, & Wu, 2016). Enron moved debt
off its books and presented a misleading financial status (Darrat et al., 2016). Adelphia
collapsed into bankruptcy after it disclosed $2.3 billion in off-balance-sheet debt in an
egregious absence of ethics (Darrat et al., 2016).
Corporate governance is meant to demonstrate awareness of the rules of
operations made by the legal and the judicial system, as well as financial and labor
markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Since the accounting scandals of the early 21st
century, corporate governance issues have attracted increasing attention from researchers,
practitioners, and policy makers (Darrat et al., 2016). The results of corporate governance
can be measured in terms of the performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and
treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).
Boards of directors are expected to complement the regulatory oversight of
executives, but the boards of Enron, World Com, AIG, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae,
and many others that included industry and social luminaries failed to prevent excessive
risk taking and the ultimate meltdowns and dissolutions of their firms (Henderson, 2013).
The board of directors has authority, in most countries, to hire, fire, and set compensation
for the CEO or the top manager, to set objectives for the firm, and to ask discerning
questions (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). Some authors believed the boards of many
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corporations had hardly changed in decades, resulting in meetings that were almost
entirely a matter of routine (Carver, 2013).
Financial crisis (2007-2009). The same underlying causes of the U.S. savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s (e.g., lax regulations, poor supervision, minimal enforcement,
and weak governance) were evident in the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (Docking, 2012).
Governance of financial services institutions was at the center of the 2007–2009 financial
crisis, during which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
was placed under government conservatorship, and the lingering aftereffects of the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression rippled around the world (Ferguson,
2013). As an example of the lack of governance in financial services institutions,
aggregate bank risk exposure to home equity loans was estimated to be 30% of the total
residential mortgage exposure and approximately $750 billion (LaCour-Little, Yu, &
Sun, 2014).
Governing boards of many financial services institutions seemed unable to
prevent the risk and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their firms, devastated their
investors, and helped precipitate a financial meltdown that evolved into a global
recession through the creation of derivative securities and collateralized debt obligations
(Travers, 2013). Towards the end of the 2000s, the U.S. financial industry entered a
period of unprecedented instability; estimated losses attributed to subprime mortgages
were between $400 and $500 billion (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). In response to the
financial instability and risk to the global economy, the U.S. Congress, through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program earmarked $475 billion to stabilize banking institutions,
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restart credit markets, rescue the auto industry, stabilize AIG, and help struggling
families avoid foreclosure (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016).
International proposals for governance promote a shareholder-based view that
governance should serve the shareholders and a stakeholder-based approach that
corporate governance should serve both shareholders and stakeholders (Dermine, 2013).
According to BASEL III, international initiatives complement country-based governance
initiatives (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015). As a result of recurring financial crises attributed
to lax corporate governance, bank leaders began adopting more responsible financial
attitudes in compliance with the new regulatory framework and focusing on ethical
practices (Paulet, Parnaudeau, & Relano, 2015).
Governance Initiatives and Strategies
Various factors contributed to corporate and financial crises. An important cause
of corporate and bank crises is accounting malpractice (Soltani, 2014). Another common
denominator reported in academic writings is executive largesse and lack of adequate
oversight (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). To thwart recurring corporate and bank crises,
there have been internal and external governance initiatives and additional calls for
effective corporate governance and ethics (Alexander et al., 2013; Paulet et al., 2015).
Some internal governance initiatives include (a) increasing the number of independent
board members, (b) separating the roles of CEO and board chair, and (c) strong audit and
nominating committee’s roles (Alexander et al., 2013). Examples of external governance
initiatives include the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, Securities and Exchange Commission
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(SEC) rules, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ regulations, and
international corporate governance (Guo, Lach, & Mobbs, 2015).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Governance failures and financial crises led to the
enactment and promulgation of the SOX Act (Guo et al., 2015). The GAO identiﬁed and
analyzed 919 restatements announced by 845 public companies from January 1, 1997,
through June 30, 2002, that involved accounting irregularities resulting in material
misstatements of ﬁnancial statements and results (Franzel, 2014). In 2002, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed House Financial Service Committee Chairman Oxley’s
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act and
transmitted it to the Senate, where Senate Banking Committee Chairman Sarbanes
submitted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act (Franzel,
2014). The resulting piece of legislation bears the names of its advocates, SarbanesOxley. In response to the SOX Act, corporate governance became the responsibility of
corporations, banks, financial institutions, legislative bodies, and the U.S. government
(Guo et al., 2015).
The SOX Act took effect on July 30, 2002, with the intent of strengthening
corporate governance and forestalling future corporate financial mismanagement
(Alexander et al., 2013). As a result of the Act, Congress established the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which required auditors of U.S. public
companies to be subject to external and independent oversight; there would be no more
self-regulated audits (PCAOB, 2017). During the Enron financial crisis, the external
auditor of the firm, Arthur Andersen, continued to issue clean opinions as part of Enron
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ﬁnancial statements until both the auditor and leaders of the auditing firm were indicted
by the Department of Justice in March 2002 for obstructing justice by inappropriately
falsifying the Enron audit (Franzel, 2014). The SOX Act requires management to assess
the effectiveness of its internal controls over financial reporting and to have an
independent auditor attest to and report on the assessment made by management of the
corporation (Alexander et al., 2013).
In the era after promulgation of the SOX Act, U.S. financial institutions have been
subjected to enhanced regulatory oversight, higher corporate scrutiny, higher penalties for
financial misstatements, stringent audit standards, and rigorous audit quality inspections
by the PCAOB (Mitra et al., 2013). Since 2002, when SOX became law, the bailout of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—two large government-sponsored enterprises—cost
taxpayers over $150 billion (Bolotnyy, 2014). Congressional Budget Office estimates
suggest that figure could double by 2019 (Bolotnyy, 2014). Mitra et al. (2013) reported
that inadequate internal monitoring and the absence of effective internal controls is likely
to result in even more agency problems.
The SOX Act provided new rules, the requirements of which were inadequate to
prevent the meltdown of financial institutions in 2008 (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014).
There is a need to learn from the history of events that led to the passage of the SOX Act.
According to Franzel (2014), government leaders should not allow the scale of recent
financial crises to happen again, and stakeholders cannot afford to wait until a full-blown
crisis is impending before making the necessary changes (Franzel, 2014).
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SOX has had an effect on the financial reporting process of firms and investors’
expectation about the quality and reliability of reported financial information (Mitra et
al., 2013). Nonetheless, inadequate internal monitoring still provides managers with the
opportunity to make operating and financial reporting decisions that serve their interests
at the cost of other stakeholders (Mitra et al., 2013). There is a large body of work on the
role of the board in corporate governance, including its composition, role of gender,
diversity, committees, shareholder rights and activism, executive compensation, and dual
board structure (Docking, 2012; Hemphill & Laurence, 2014; Leone et al., 2013; Zeitoun,
Osterloh, & Frey, 2014). Many scholarly articles have been published examining the
relationship of corporate governance to financial performance, malfeasance,
sustainability, and data security (Peters & Romi, 2015; Raelin & Bondy, 2013; Rai &
Mar, 2014; Yu, 2013). There is synergy created when the board and CEO are engaged in
strengthening proactive internal control and response governance (Schillemans, 2013).
Much of the literature on corporate governance and the CEO’s role involve
curtailing the CEO’s power and discretion. Filatotchev and Nakajima (2014), Sarpal
(2014), and Srinidhi, Yan, and Tayi (2015) have promoted the separation of the role of
the CEO and chairmanship of the board, CEO tenure, and limitations on strategic
decision making. Few researchers offer practical approaches by which the board should
work with the CEO to optimize the corporate goals and benefit all stakeholders. In
essence, weak internal controls are believed to exacerbate managers’ aggressive risktaking behavior and their tendency to misreport financial information (Mitra et al., 2013).
Voluntary and mandatory calls for governance reforms by regulatory authorities may be
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equally effective, and high-quality corporate governance mitigates the diversion of
managerial resources and improves firm values (Feng & Yue, 2013).
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Following
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act was introduced in both the House and Senate by Financial Services
Committee Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris
Dodd and became law on July 21, 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; Pope & Lee, 2013). The
resulting piece of legislation bears the names of its advocates, Dodd-Frank Act.
Economic and financial crises brought on by a breakdown in corporate ethics, laissezfaire regulation, and limited liability in leveraged securitization amongst executives in
many firms that included Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Goldman Sachs (Arce, 2013).
The aim of the Dodd-Frank Act is to promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end too
big to fail, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, and to protect consumers
from abusive financial services practices (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The five largest U.S.
financial firms together have assets representing over half of Gross Domestic Product and
one failure means systemic consequences (Hoenig, 2014). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010)
arising in the wake of the financial crisis, is a significant attempt to strengthen corporate
governance by giving shareholders more control over executive pay and making the
board of directors and their compensation committees more independent and accountable
(Conyon, 2014).
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The Congressional summary to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose
of Dodd-Frank Act is to, create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, rein in Wall
Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and too big to fail, and prevent another financial
crisis (Arce, 2013). In drafting the Act, Congress believed that corporate governance
arrangements before 2010 were weak or ineffective and more needed to be done to curb
excess executive compensation. Before Dodd-Frank, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)
addressed accounting and financial reforms in the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals (Conyon, 2014).
Corporate governance had failed to rein in alleged corporate excess; boards and
compensation committees were at the behest of CEOs and were not sufficiently
safeguarding shareholder interests (Conyon, 2014). The canonical approach to the study
of corporate governance in financial economics – agency theory – was created in
recognition of the potential for opportunistic behavior in organizations characterized by
principal–agent relationships (Arce, 2013). Dodd-Frank Act was designed to prevent the
excessive risk-taking that led to the financial crisis by instituting reforms to create a more
stable and responsible financial system that holds Wall Street accountable, discourages
irresponsible financial risk-taking, and ends taxpayer-funded bailouts (Pope & Lee,
2013).
There has been complaints’ regarding increased compliance burden associated
with the rules, increases in staffing required, additional training, and time allocation for
regulatory compliance and updates to compliance systems (GAO, 2015). Title I of the
Dodd-Frank Act was intended to address this issue by requiring the largest firms to map
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out a bankruptcy strategy and should bankruptcy fail to work, Title H of Dodd-Frank
would enable the government to nationalize and ultimately liquidate a failing systemic
firm (Hoenig, 2014). Banks controlling assets of more than $10 billion have come to
compose an overwhelming proportion of the U.S. economy, and those with more than a
trillion dollars in assets dominate this group that even one of the largest five banks were
to fail, it would devastate markets and the economy (Hoenig, 2014).
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), NYSE, and NASDAQ rules and
regulations. In early 2002, as a response to several corporate scandals, the SEC called on
the NYSE and NASDAQ to design regulatory changes that required boards of publicly
listed companies to have a strict majority of independent outside directors (Schmeiser,
2014). According to Volker, a well-respected economist, subprime mortgage costs
exceeded a trillion dollars for 3 years, indicating it was ill advised to underestimate the
importance of banking regulations (Feldstein, 2013). The 2013 amendments to the listing
standards of the NYSE and NASDAQ, approved by the SEC, require the board to
consider all factors relevant to determining whether the director has a relationship that is
material to the director's ability to be independent from management (Lilienfeld, Cannon,
Bennett, & Spera, 2013). NYSE listing standards Section 303 deals explicitly with
corporate governance standards and specifies that boards must have a majority of
independent directors (Conyon, 2014).
A director is not independent if the director, or an immediate family member, has
been an employee or received fees above a threshold in the last 3 years, is an employee of
the auditor, or has had a financial relationship with the enterprise (Conyon, 2014).
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Congress, the NYSE, and the NASDAQ enacted standards to improve the quality of
corporate governance, but voluntary implementation of stronger corporate governance
intended to improve the quality of disclosures and exceeding current corporate
governance standards does not appear to have resulted in disclosures of superior quality
(Harp, Myring, & Shortridge, 2014). These regulations reduced variations in the quality
of financial information available to investors, but more control measures are needed to
affect the kinds of changes needed in the corporate governance system (Harp et al.,
2014).
Additional governance initiatives. Many governance initiatives have been
designed to derive long-term benefits for businesses, banks, and corporations. Lessambo
(2013) insisted that the primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance
and act in the best interest of shareholders by delivering a good return on investment.
Bistrova et al. (2014) concluded that the role of the board is to enable effective corporate
governance and strategies toward long-term shareholder value maximization and
protection of all stakeholders. Zeitoun et al. (2014) contended that stratified sampling was
best for appointing stakeholder representatives from among qualified candidates to the
board and that this approach would enable the board to act autonomously in the interest
of all. The stratified sampling method of selection should yield diverse board members
that would generate wealth and maintain the sustainable competitive advantage for the
firm (Zeitoun et al., 2014).
Investors often clamor for stronger governance (Bushee et al., 2014). Venture
firms that undertake investments for wealthy clients that are usually willing to take on
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more risk (Garg, 2013). Garg (2013) noted that the boards of directors of venture firms
typically include inside directors who have broad industry knowledge and outside board
members who are informed and have professional obligations. Hedge funds are large
investments made by a small group of wealthy and experienced investors (Bebchuk,
Brav, & Jiang, 2013). Bebchuk et al. (2013) explained that activist hedge funds,
motivated by their large financial stakes in firms, often successfully lobby for change at
target companies. Firms with CEO duality, fewer directors nominated by the CEO, higher
levels of outside director ownership, and pressure-resistant institutional shareholdings are
more likely to repeal poison pills because they perceive governance mechanisms
designed to limit managerial opportunism as complements to other mechanisms that
minimize agency problems (Schepker & Oh, 2013). Poison pills are antitakeover
provisions that carry potential agency costs; they are unnecessary when governance is
strong (Rhee & Fiss, 2014).
Audit committees are a type of board that has strong influence over operations,
strategy, and firm performance (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). The goal of audit
committees is to protect investors' interests by taking the lead on oversight responsibility
in the areas of internal control, financial reporting, audit, and compliance, as decreed in
Section 301 of the SOX Act (2002). Audit committees are responsible for appointing and
supervising external auditors, reviewing financial reports, overseeing the effectiveness of
the internal control structure of the organization, and overseeing of the whistleblower
process (SOX Act, 2002).
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Lin, Yeh, and Yang (2014) wrote that the performance of a board depends on how
all members commit themselves to their supervisory responsibilities. The rising demand
for independent directors resulting from regulations may have led to individual directors
serving on multiple committees with negative governance consequences (Karim, Robin,
& Suh, 2016). Board attendance decreases with multiple directorships, meeting
frequency, and board size (Lin et al., 2014).
There is concern for the impact of multiple directorships on board member
effectiveness (Karim et al., 2016). Choudhary, Schloetzer, and Sturgess (2013) found that
weak disclosure was the chief cause of financial malfeasance. To attain and sustain
corporate financial performance, the firm must balance the wealth creating and wealth
protecting roles of corporate governance (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Raelin &
Bondy, 2013). It is important to probe the factors in board processes that are critical to
board effectiveness (Kakabadse et al., 2015). The number of directorships and mandatory
meeting attendance should be considered when assessing the involvement of new
directors. The combination of busy directors and a complex board can result in poor
meeting attendance and ineffective corporate governance (Lin et al., 2014).
Warren Buffett, an American business magnate, investor, and philanthropist,
emphasized that performance should be the basis for executive pay decisions (Bowen,
Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2014). Buffett recommended that investors should have a
strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring goodwill,
conditioned upon effective corporate governance and strategic management (Bowen et
al., 2014). Ineffective corporate governance in large individual financial institutions may
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have significant impact on the economy (Feldstein, 2013). Effective governance is
typically characterized by higher quality disclosure and strong internal monitoring
mechanisms (Bushee et al., 2014).
To strengthen corporate governance, some have called for some measure of
managerial governance in addition to board governance (Starbuck, 2014). In conjunction
with board governance, it is important to improve managerial governance (Starbuck,
2014) in light of past governance lapses. Many researchers perceive managerial
governance as a form of self-governance that would not result in effective governance
(Feldstein, 2013). Some academic writers support neo-liberalism, which advocates free
markets and less regulations, self-regulation, financial liberation, and deregulation as
stimulants of economic growth (Azkunaga, San-Jose, & Urionabarrenetxea, 2013).
Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2014) cautioned that the contribution of a single
financial institution to the deficiency of a system may be more relevant during periods of
market stress. A widely-accepted view espoused by Bushee et al. (2014) is that effective
corporate governance is a determinant of investment decisions for many investors and
allows institutional investors, with large portfolios, to better perform their fiduciary
responsibility to protect their investments.
Since the 1980s, liberalization and deregulation were promoted and drove the
financial entities in the direction of the free market where business leaders could act with
greater freedom (Azkunaga et al., 2013). Past regulations seemed to have a strong impact
initially, but faded as time passed; examples include those made by the SEC in 1933 and
1934 following Black Tuesday, those of the late 1930s following the McKesson Robbins
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scandal, after the equity funding and Continental Vending frauds during the 1970s, and
more (Harp et al., 2014). Despite these regulations, corporate scandals continued to occur
across varying industries throughout time (Harp et al., 2014).
Strong corporate governance practices may have encouraged rather than
constrained excessive risk-taking in the financial industry; financial institutions with
stronger and more shareholder-focused corporate governance mechanisms and boards of
directors are associated with higher levels of systemic risk (Iqbal, Strobl, & Vähämaa,
2015). Harp et al. (2014) concluded that compliance with regulations such as SOX in
conjunction with strong ethics education can lead to effective governance for
organizations that continue to produce high-quality disclosures. This behavior reflects the
operating strategies and economic consequences of responsible firm activities (Harp et
al., 2014).
Robertson, Blevins, and Duffy (2013) engaged in the literature review of journal
articles and found that the percentage that was ethics-related increased following the
2007-2009 financial crisis and that most business leaders agree that there is a link
between ethics, corporate social performance, and financial results. In essence, good
ethics is a strategic advantage (Robertson et al., 2013). Pitelis (2013) concluded that for
corporate governance to foster sustainable value creation, there should be an ethical
dimension in managing the affairs of the company. Ultimately, ethics, internal
governance, and legislative and regulatory oversight are important to sound corporate
governance.
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Effective corporate governance is important for many reasons, including
prevention of corporate malfeasance and development of organizational resilience in the
face of governance difficulties such as cyber-attacks (Rai & Mar, 2014). All stakeholders
may benefit from efficient management of banks and financial institutions (Dermine,
2013). These benefits extend beyond profit maximization and the corporation; there are
social ramifications for employees, shareholders, communities, and the nation as a whole
(Bistrova et al., 2014). The three primary responsibilities that board members fill involve
control or monitoring, affiliation with external organizations, and expert advice and
guidance (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). These responsibilities are indicated in both the
agency and stewardship theories.
International corporate governance. There are two primary patterns of board
structure. The unitary board system is commonly referred to as the Anglo-American
system and the two-board system is commonly referred to as the German-Japanese
system, under which the board of directors is responsible for running the company, while
the supervisory board functions as a special monitoring unit (Lee, 2015). The dual board
system features separation of the CEO and independent audit committee (Zeitoun et al.,
2014). Among the advantages of the dual board are the option to appoint stakeholder
representatives to the board, improved monitoring, enhanced corporate governance, and a
focus on the interest of all stakeholders (Zeitoun et al., 2014). Although the dual board
approach promotes checks and balances, this style of corporate governance may be
burdened by high board costs, communication problems, redundancies, and gaps in
internal supervision (Lee, 2015).
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There is continued effort to strengthen international corporate governance. The
Financial Stability Board (FSB; 2015), established in 2009, is an international
organization that coordinates various national financial agencies and standards-setting
bodies at an international level. The FSB (2015) is committed to building resilient
organizations. This international body is aimed at developing strong regulatory,
supervisory, and stabilizing international financial markets (FSB, 2015).
Basel III is an international regulatory accord that includes framework and reform
stipulations for banks (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015). With a goal of promoting a more
resilient banking sector, Basel III established rigorous data and quarterly reporting
requirements, disclosure requirements, liquidity risk limits, leveraged ratio framework,
bank supervision, and derivatives. Banks utilize short-term debt to invest in long-term
assets and should enhance their internal governance structure with strong liquidity
requirements, complemented by increased transparency (Ratnovski, 2013). Proponents of
Basel’s regulations and requirements expected financial institutions would already have
the governance structure to comply (Samitas & Polyzos, 2015).
Trends in international governance also include an intensified effort to reform
some important international organizations (Artuso & McLarney, 2015). One of the
targets of international governance reform is the World Trade Organization, which deals
with the rules of trade between nations (Ruggie, 2014). Another target is the International
Labor Organization, which is committed to improving the living conditions of workers,
workers’ rights, and fair compensation for workers (Artuso & McLarney, 2015).
Lessambo (2013) wrote that the non-binding governance model of the Organization for
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Economic Cooperation and Development’s 33 developed nations including the United
States become binding. International regulatory framework and organizations are also
concerned with legislation at the national level around the world, including in the United
States, where the focus of efforts includes enhanced risk mitigation strategies such as the
use of derivatives, securitization, credit risk transfer, and currency hedging (Ratnovski,
2013).
Some experts have continued to declare austerity as a necessary governance
measure for international banks, especially in light of debt problems with Greece in 2010
(Anderson & Minneman, 2014). Austerity, a deficit reduction strategy, is characterized
by reduction in government expenditure, tax increases, reduction and elimination of
entitlement programs, and privatization of public corporations; at the international level,
austerity is often a requirement for financial bailout and a means of enhancing the
repayment of public debt (Anderson & Minneman, 2014). Although touted as an effective
measure to repay debt and attain solvency, austerity often has serious ramifications for
the debtor nation which include lower rates of investment and a lower rate of
entrepreneurship, which results in slower growth for the economy (Anderson &
Minneman, 2014).
Nongovernmental organizations, strong media complement investor activism,
and board vigilance. When multinational enterprises collaborate with various
stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations, in countries with fragile political
frameworks and weak governance structure, there are positive philanthropic, legal,
ethical, and governance ramifications (Kolk & Lenfant, 2013). The media are a powerful
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conduit for institutional pressure and for effectively monitoring management (Luo &
Salterio, 2014). As an external governance force on internal management policy, board
vigilance and investor activism have an indirect impact on internal governance systems
(Cohn & Rajan, 2013). This indirect impact often creates corporate value (Cohn & Rajan,
2013).
Current Corporate Governance Challenges
Cyber security, corporate crises, and trade partnerships are among the current
corporate governance challenges. The theft of information and the intentional disruption
of online or digital processes are among the most prominent risks that business leaders
face today (Brewer, 2015). A data breach can be costly in terms of both finances and
reputations (Brewer, 2015), while corporate crises can have long-term adverse impacts on
corporate integrity.
Cyber security. Effective boards require capable, informed, strategic thinkers to
engage in spirited discussions about strategic objectives to keep a corporation
competitive (Vincent, 2015). Corporate data security is a current strategic and
governance concern (Brewer, 2015). Recent cyber incursions have extended beyond retail
and healthcare into many government agencies, energy grids, and critical infrastructure
(Brewer, 2015). The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology defines critical
infrastructures as the system and assets, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, economy, public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters (Colesniuc, 2013).
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In 2013, a breach of data at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
compromised the integrity of personal data from 4.2 million federal employees and 19.7
applicants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016). Almost 66% of U.S. firms
reported cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure control systems in recent years (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2016). In January 2015, one of the largest health
insurers in the country discovered a cyber-incursion that compromised the personally
identifiable information of approximately 80 million people (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2016).
Standards and guidelines for effective practices to address cyber risks
recommended by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2014) are voluntary, even though
effective corporate governance and strategic management are critical to the success of
organizations and to national security. The advent of computer technology has given rise
to a new type of crime: cybercrime (Strikwerda, 2014). Cybercrime includes the spread
of computer viruses and e-fraud, and has facilitated the rapid propagation of criminal
practices of espionage, sabotage, criminal syndicates, extortion, theft, subversion, and
persecution on a global scale (Strikwerda, 2014).
Security of private information and cyber security are important components of
enterprise risk awareness (Brewer, 2015). Managers, executives, and the board of
directors of organizations have risk oversight responsibilities to prevent cyber security
breaches (Rai & Mar, 2014). The board should ensure periodic checks are conducted
within the organization and know the risks of involvement with third-party service
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providers (Rai & Mar, 2014). Corporate governance has many goals, including protecting
against malfeasance and promoting the interests of stakeholders (Yu, 2013).
Corporate governance could play a major role in enhancing data security and
protection of private, confidential, secret, and proprietary information assets. Although
enterprise mobility, including cloud services, may make an organization more productive,
it also creates layers of complexity and risk, making information technology
environments increasingly vulnerable while rendering firewalls and many anti-virus
software programs incapable of preventing well-funded and organized cyber-attacks
(Brewer, 2015). Peters and Romi (2015) found that that board committee member
knowledge, expertise and capability is generally associated with increases in committeelevel performance, sustainability governance and contributions as a board member. A
well-informed board should be invested in cyber security, remain aware of all cyber
breach attempts against the organization, have regular briefings, ensure the organization
maintains continued relationships with the local and national authorities responsible for
taking action against cyber-attacks, while maintaining adequate cyber risk insurance (Rai
& Mar, 2014). Cyber security constitutes a present and critical corporate governance
imperative (Brewer, 2015).
Robeson and O'Connor (2013) researched the effect of governance board on
performance of firms in terms of innovation and noted that the board influences through
strategic planning and funding that elevates corporate performance. Ensuring cyber
resilience is a leadership responsibility (Strikwerda, 2014). Agency theory suggests that
managers and investors have different preferences regarding security risk; investors can
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diversify their capital over different firms to reduce firm-specific risk, but managers
cannot diversify their investment of human capital in their firm (Srinidhi et al., 2015). As
such, managers face greater risk of financial distress during their limited tenure than do
investors (Srinidhi et al., 2015). Cyber security is important to shareholders, the board,
management, and all stakeholders.
Losses in the banking industry caused by white collar crimes have reached
billions of dollars, far in excess of conventional and traditional techniques of bank
robbery, making cyber security an ongoing challenge and a foremost economic and
national security concern (Bambara, 2015). Colesniuc (2013) and Vincent (2015)
indicated that corporate governance plays a role in enhancing data security and protection
of private, confidential, secret, and proprietary information assets (Rai & Mar, 2014).
Data breach incidents are on the rise, resulting in severe financial consequences and legal
implications for the affected organizations (Brewer, 2015). A 2014 report revealed that an
estimated that 12.6 million Americans were victims of identity fraud (Sen & Borle,
2015). In a study by Ponemon Institute on the cost of data breaches released in May
2014, the approximate average cost per data breach incident was $5.9 million for
organizations in the United States (Sen & Borle, 2015).
Board leadership and composition is a popular focus of many studies addressing
the matter of IT risks (Bambara, 2015; Brewer, 2015; Kumar & Singh, 2013). A
challenge for board members is their ability to understand the emerging technological
advances; the average age of directors has increased from 60.1 in 2002 to 62.6 in 2012
(Kumar & Singh, 2013). There have been many questions raised about board composition
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(Kumar & Singh, 2013). The board of directors and efficient corporate governance are
critical to innovation, creating value, and maintaining the competitive advantage of the
organization (McCahery & Vermeulen, 2014).
Corporate crises. Delayed recall of defective products and parts remain a critical
strategic and governance issue. Decisions made concerning a recall are important to a
firm from three standpoints: cost, customer safety, and corporate reputation (Steinbeck,
2014). The repercussions for many corporations may extend beyond consumer
confidence to severe financial impact and tort violations (Jizi et al., 2014). The U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) fined Toyota $1.2 billion in 2014 for sudden acceleration
problems that Toyota executives knew about long before the recall compelled the
company to take action (DOJ, 2014).
The board of directors is responsible for the development of sustainable business
strategies and the supervision of the responsible use of the assets of the firm (Jizi et al.,
2014). Banks are being held accountable. The DOJ uses the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and civil penalty provisions
to pursue prosecutions against banks (MacDonald, 2016). FIRREA provides the DOJ
with powers to seek civil financial penalties for violations of certain criminal statutes
against anyone violating any of the enumerated criminal statutes that involve or affect
financial institutions or government agencies (MacDonald, 2016). On February 9, 2012,
the DOJ announced a $25 billion settlement with five banks, the Bank of America, JP
Morgan Chase & Co, Wells Fargo & Company, Citigroup Inc., and Ally Financial Inc.
(formerly GMAC)(MacDonald, 2016).
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Through their voting rights, shareholders have the formal power to influence the
governance of public companies (Norli, Ostergaard, & Schindele, 2015). Norli et al.
(2015) insisted that directors should be prosecuted more often and more aggressively than
has been done in the past, particularly when company directors or executives have
committed a grave offense. By contrast, Travers (2013) asserted that the prosecution of
directors was sufficient as it appears to be considerably more widespread than the
prosecution of individual employees. Shareholders seeking to replace existing board
members in a proxy contest must run a public campaign, hire legal expertise, and pay for
producing and distributing their slate of directors to other shareholders of the company
(Norli et al., 2015).
Shareholder activism has increased since the crisis of 2007-2009, with calls for
board member accountability (Gillian & Panasian, 2015). There has been litigation
initiated by shareholders (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). Since 2000, there has been a
dramatic upsurge in shareholder lawsuits against firms, executives, and board members,
with aggregate U.S. securities class action settlements increasing from $1 billion between
1996 and 1999 to $10.6 billion in 2006 (Gillian & Panasian, 2015). Brochet and
Srinivasan (2014) suggested that directors who might have stopped the fraud or played a
larger role in a securities violation, such as audit committee members, are more likely to
be targeted; those targeted are more likely to have votes withheld and lose their board
seat. The repercussions are broad and may be severe. Deng, Willis, and Xu (2014) found
that defendant firms in class action lawsuits incur higher borrowing fees and interest rates
due to, a loss of reputation of the firm. Firms subject to securities litigation have limited
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investment opportunities, both in terms of capital expenditures and research and
development (Autore, Hutton, Peterson, & Smith, 2014).
Trade partnerships. Artuso and McLarney (2015) wrote that advocates of
linking labor standards and trade policy fear that increased trade and deeper integration of
globalization may continue to lead firms to move production to low-cost locations with
lower standards of safety and security. Advocating for high labor standards may reduce
wages in countries that maintain and enforce high labor standards; these same actions
may and motivate corporations and governments to weaken or remove standards to
improve the competitive advantage offered by their country (Artuso & McLarney, 2015).
Corporate governance in the United States requires that banks and corporations have
effective policies and safeguards that manage important strategic issues as board
members have fiduciary responsibility which requires them to act and protect shareholder
interests (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013).
Widely adopted lean practices and low production costs promote cost savings and
competitive advantage through outsourcing, but companies that choose to outsource must
be prepared to assume risk, both upstream and downstream throughout the supply chain
(Chakravarty, 2013). The new outsourcing model established at Boeing involved
establishing partnerships with approximately 50 Tier 1 strategic associates, which was a
positive opportunity, but was quickly followed by unexpected problems (Thorne &
Quinn, 2016). In early 2013, Boeing encountered problems with fabrication of its 787
Dreamliner that eventually resulted in the entire fleet being grounded due to inability to
effectively manage secondary suppliers (Thorne & Quinn, 2016). Good oversight of
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overseas suppliers’ factory operations and strategic partners could promote the corporate
image (Hilson, 2014).
Success in overseeing collaborators’ global supply chains depends on shared
value and good corporate governance that is often at odds with the realities of power,
information asymmetry, and reward systems (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Poorly
matched partners can mean reliance on an overseas company whose leaders accept
continued poor working conditions (Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Violations of
workers’ legal rights in the interest of economic efficiency is fundamentally incompatible
with the duty of multinationals to respect employees and ensure that offshore factories,
whether internal to the organization or owned by their suppliers and subcontractors, are in
full compliance with local laws (Preiss, 2014). Good governance transcends national
borders.
Connected world. There are other current and evolving corporate governance
challenges. The global population is connected. Economic ripples that began in far-off
nations have reverberated to other parts of the world, including the United States
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Likewise, the economic crisis that began in the United
States led to a global recession (Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Global trade alliances,
business computer applications, mobile computing, international migration, and global
supply chains have increased the pace of globalization (Artuso & McLarney, 2015).
Current trends in globalization have spurred the need to re-examine the political and
economic wisdom of alliances such as the European Union relative to regional trade
alliances such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (2016).
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Resurgence of the fair-trade movement has both influenced and counteracted
trade imbalances, outsourcing of jobs, inequality, social advocacy on the topic of
consumers’ rights, as well as improvements in banking and corporate governance (Artuso
& McLarney, 2015). There is value in studying mistakes made in the past, articulating
lessons learned, and implementing mitigating strategies. Board members have a fiduciary
responsibility to act and protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Internal and external monitoring mechanisms, the
effectiveness of board independence, and CEO non duality governance mechanisms are
widely believed to resolve the agency problem and result in profitability (Misangyi &
Acharya, 2014). Consequently, board selection criteria are important to assuage the
agency problem, allowing for strategies to mature and strong corporate governance to
take root.
Board Selection Criteria
Corporate governance in the banking industry had failed many times in several
nations, and banking crises seem to be a recurrent phenomenon: 13 major financial crises
have been observed since the 1990s (Dermine, 2013). Flaws in corporate governance
systems lead to financial market scandals that in turn caused significant losses to
investors (Khemakhem & Naciri, 2015). Contingency approaches in comparative
corporate governance can help firms maintain their financial performance (Desender,
Aguilera, Crespi-Cladera, & Garcia-Cestona, 2013). There is a high premium placed on
finding competent leaders who understand new business opportunities and their risks,
have a healthy level of skepticism, and can make decisions quickly (Capriglione &
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Casalino, 2014). Active boards of directors and board practices designed to achieve longterm utility rather than short-term opportunistic advantages are central to the prescription
of agency theory to protecting owners' interests, minimize agency costs, and ensure
alignment between principals’ and agents’ interests (Conheady et al., 2015).
Lam, Zhang, and Lee (2013) analyzed whether the norms of decision makers and
behavioral factors such as managerial traits and biases can affect executives’ financing
decisions. Based on these analyses, Lam et al. concluded that the executive’s type of
leadership has an influence on fiscal policy, finance posture, and governance in any
institution. There is increasing economic interdependence of countries around the world.
The movement of capital across borders has been liberalized. Financial
information is transmitted almost instantly (Valentina & Ivan, 2013). Global markets and
financial centers are connected without interruption, 24 hours a day (Valentina & Ivan,
2013). As a result of these trends in interconnectedness, the global financial system has
become volatile (Valentina & Ivan, 2013). These trends increase the need for a vigilant
board and a focus on iterative risk analysis and mitigation (Capriglione & Casalino,
2014). There is the need for strategic agility, which is the ability of executives and boards
of directors of companies to adapt to changes in the business environment and to
influence that environment (Mavengere, 2013).
The agency view of corporate governance demands sufficient monitoring to align
agency interests with those of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This alignment
represents a reactive answer and in some cases, an innovative incentive contract that is
contingent upon performance (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). Such a contract
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comprehensively governs the relationship between agency and principal interests,
reducing the moral hazard problem (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). This type of contract
requires an effective board (Hoeppner & Kirchner, 2016). Corporate governance in banks
involves the practices of boards of directors and senior management who must
collaborate to set corporate objectives and provide strategic direction for responsible
decision making, accountability to shareholders, compliance with applicable laws,
protection of depositors, and consideration for stakeholders (Leventis et al., 2013).
Effective corporate governance is imperative for executives and boards in the banking
industry to thwart and manage potential crisis and deter unethical business practices
(Leventis et al., 2013).
There is considerable variability in the director nomination process. Some
organizations follow formal, structured approaches, while others are relatively informal
and organic (Clune, Hermanson, Tompkins, & Ye, 2014). In most banks in the United
States, the nominating committee of the board usually identifies and nominates
individuals for board service (Clune et al., 2014). External search firms and a matrix/grid
approach for assessing director skill sets across the board are parts of the selection
process (Clune et al., 2014). Nohel et al. (2014) found that companies that hold board
elections every 3 years went from about 60% of S&P 500 companies in 2001 to well
under 20% in 2014. The market perceived this change in election frequency as a positive
one, indicating that investors preferred well-governed corporations with boards that are
accountable to shareholders (Nohel et al., 2014). The goal of the nominating committee is
to enhance the ability of the board to function effectively (Clune et al., 2014).
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Business Roundtable (2012) is an organization of CEOs of U.S. companies.
Nearly 20% of the total value of the U.S. stock market is represented in the Business
Roundtable. Members of the association function broadly on boards of directors.
According to members of the association, boards of directors serve with an expectation
by shareholders and other constituencies of vigorous and diligent oversight of corporate
affairs in:


selecting and evaluating the position of CEO;



planning for senior management development and succession;



reviewing, understanding and monitoring the implementation of the
corporation's strategic plans;



reviewing and understanding the corporation's risk assessment and overseeing
the corporation's risk management processes;



reviewing, understanding and overseeing annual operating plans and budgets;



focusing on the integrity and clarity of the corporation's financial statements
and reporting;



advising management on significant issues facing the corporation;



reviewing and approving significant corporate actions;



reviewing management's plans for business resiliency;



nominating directors and committee members and overseeing effective
corporate governance; and



overseeing legal and ethical compliance.
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The skills and background of the executive and board members are intended to
promote governance while also guiding investments in research, development, and
innovation (Yuan, Guo, & Fang, 2014). These actions translate into superior corporate
financial performance (Yuan et al., 2014). The composition of a board is crucial to
effectiveness of the board and its ability to supervise the CEO (Sur et al., 2013).
Academic institutions remain a source of knowledge (Starbuck, 2014). As purportedly
commercially and politically neutral institutions that emphasize open, fact-based
discussion, members of universities can enhance the quality of governance by senior
executives as well as outside stakeholders (Starbuck, 2014). In essence, governance best
practices and effective governance are value-enhancing strategies (Conheady et al.,
2015).
Board member selection criteria continue to include knowledge and experience
(Elms et al., 2015). Elms et al. (2015) reported candidates should have an existing
knowledge of how boards operate and possess role-fit skills that complemented those of
current directors. Viable candidates for boards of directors should also be a good group
fit and be socially compatible with the existing directors (Bezemer, Nicholson, &
Pugliese, 2014). Being a good group fit is essential because board members need to
interact and work together as a team (Bezemer et al., 2014).
Other factors that are important to board governance include term limits and
education that encourages board members’ appreciation of the value of diversity in the
debate (Carver, 2013). Kakabadse et al. (2015) questioned whether functional diversity
(e.g., education, technical abilities, and functional background) and non regulated aspects
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of diversity (e.g., socioeconomic background, personality characteristics, or values) affect
board effectiveness. A. N. Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) investigated how
demographic features of the board, such as age, gender, and educational composition,
affect corporate governance in banking. A. N. Berger et al. found that having younger
members on the board increased portfolio risk and, to a lesser extent, having a higher
proportion of female executives also increased portfolio risk, while having board
members with doctoral degrees reduced portfolio risk.
Zhu, Wei, and Hillman (2014) highlighted the importance of demographic
characteristics of appointed directors (e.g., age, education, background, and gender), but
failed to explain whether these attributes were the reason for selection of that individual
or whether other social and political influences played a contributing role. Other board
member attributes include status and prestige, which help to reduce uncertainty and
signal legitimacy to investors (Acharya & Pollock, 2012). An opposing view is that the
more politically affiliated trustees on the board, the greater the affinity for risk-taking
behavior and risk shifting, which is the tendency to make more daring decisions when in
groups than when acting alone (Bradley, Pantzalis, & Yuan, 2016).
Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2015) asserted that gender quota legislation,
which forces firms to respond quickly to identify, develop, promote, and retain suitable
female talent for corporate board leadership structure, has a strong and positive impact on
the strategic direction of publicly traded and state-owned enterprises. Gender difference
is usually a decisive factor for board performance and overall or aggregate financial
performance in the capital markets (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). In many industries,
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gender diversity is positively correlated with performance (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014).
Female directors enhance the instrumental, relational, and moral legitimacy of the board,
thus increasing perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the board, all of
which are pivotal to fostering shareholder trust (Perrault, 2015). Some scholars argued
that gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors of CEOs; and although gender-diverse
boards are usually considered a positive characteristic, they may harm well-governed
firms where additional monitoring is counterproductive (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, &
Nieto, 2012).
A. N. Berger et al. (2014) documented a negative relationship between an
increase in the number of female board directors and bank risk resulting from less
experience in dealing with high risks compared to male board members. Another
perspective is that the presence of a small number of women on the board has an
insignificant effect on board performance, and if women are a minority in the boardroom,
they are less likely to challenge their male counterparts (Kakabadse et al., 2015). Sun,
Zhu, and Ye (2015) espoused a more prevalent view, arguing that equalizing the board
variable of gender diversity could influence strategic decision making and have a positive
impact on corporate financial performance. Kakabadse et al. (2015) concluded that
gender diversity enhances boardroom discussions, creativity, and allows for different
perspectives; thereby, reducing the likelihood of uncritical groupthink.
In general, board diversity fosters openness, resolution of conflicts, integration of
different perspectives, and allows for an environment in which better decisions are made
(Sun et al., 2015). The board of directors not only advises and monitors the CEO’s
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activities, but also makes strategic decisions (Mathew, Ibrahim, & Archbold, 2016).
Mathew et al. (2016) asserted that the ability of board members to provide valuable input
and challenge decisions depends on the board composition and its attributes. Diversity is
important toward board performance (Zhu et al., 2014). Walker, Machold, and Ahmed
(2015), investigated whether personality trait diversity in conjunction with demographic
diversity explained the differences in cognitive conflict and affective conflict in boards,
found no direct relationship. Walker et al. concluded it is important for the director
nomination process to encourage the selection of directors with varied demographic
attributes to enhance board dynamics.
The banking industry, which was held accountable for the credit crunch that
began in the United States in 2008 and spread globally, is important to the U.S. economy:
it captured more than half (58%) of the global investment banking revenues in 2012
(Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Gilles (2016) cautioned that the global economic crisis
that began as a banking system crisis pointed to a pattern of instability and possible future
financial crises due to sovereign debt, growing inequality, and globalization.
Ramachandran, Ngete, Subramaninan, and Sambasivan (2015) stated that globalization
and multinationalization of businesses had increased the need for best practices in
corporate governance. Gilles warned that the United States is on the precipice of another
financial crisis unless bank governance is strengthened. The next looming financial crisis
involves the student loan/debt bubble (Mueller, 2015). Student loans are the second
highest category of consumer debt in the United States and account for $1.2 trillion of
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debt, the result of the average 4-year private university tuition having increased from
$10,273 in 1974 to $31,231 in 2014 (Mueller, 2015).
During the economic crisis that began in 2008, the U.S. government bailed out
some banks that were deemed too big to fail (Barth & Wihlborg, 2016). The notion of
being too big to fail is a reference to banks that are perceived as generating unacceptable
risk to the banking system and indirectly to the economy as a whole; if these banks were
to default, they would be unable to fulfill their obligations and would trigger a collapse in
the economy (Barth & Wihlborg, 2016). Investors believe assurances made by the federal
government to not bail out large firms in the future is a hollow promise because of past
precedents and the potential damage to the economy (Gromley, Johnson, & Changyong,
2015). As of 2016, some banks may still be too big to fail. Roe (2014) asserted that many
investors believe there is the high likelihood that big banks will be bailed out again if
another crisis comes to fruition.
Size, the number of subsidiaries, and extent of involvement in market-based
activities increased systemic risk (Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2014). Controls instituted
through corporate governance help to keep firms competitive and efficient, but these
controls deteriorate in too-big-to-fail financial firms (Roe, 2014). Roe (2014) argued that
these controls impede shareholders, the board of directors, and the CEO from
restructuring the firm, even if such a restructuring would be operationally wise. Board
composition and board selection criteria are critical to ensuring effective corporate
governance (Kumar & Singh, 2013).
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The answer to the question of what constitutes effective corporate governance
continues to evolve. Cook and Glass (2015) concluded that diverse boards rather than
mere tokenism are positively associated with effective corporate governance practices
and product development; diverse boards are paramount for achieving corporate benefits.
Effective corporate governance is based on internal and external environments and
ensures the optimal use of resources, maximization of corporate performance, and
minimization of risk, all while protecting the interests of investors and stakeholders
(Fülöp, 2013). Corporate governance is the purview of the CEO and board members
(Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Effective corporate governance is incumbent upon control
of the board over financial reporting (Fülöp, 2013). Credit risk, the risk of loss due to
debtors’ nonpayment of the principal or interest on a loan or a particular line of credit,
has resulted from poor governance practices (Switzer & Wang, 2013).
Some propositions for board modifications have recommended professional
boards consisting of retired executives with industry-specific expertise (Hemphill &
Laurence, 2014). While Hemphill and Laurence (2014) advocated for a professional
board, Carver (2013) argued that retired executives are vulnerable to groupthink because
they share similar perspectives and lack creativity. Zeitoun et al. (2014) along with
Carver, contended that a professional board is a poor substitute for an advisory system
entirely under CEO control. Lack of full vision, clarity, and creativity are traits of
groupthink (Carver, 2013). There is no full vision without a wide variety of perspectives,
there is no clarity without a willingness to dig into issues, and there is no creativity
without diverse perspectives (Carver, 2013).
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The number of hours that independent directors spend on board-related activities
(and commensurate compensation received) should be considered as potential valueadding corporate governance improvements (Hemphill & Laurence, 2014). Allocating
more power to the board of directors is the best strategy for corporations because the
meetings are easier to convene, cost less to the corporation when board members are
more specialized, and specialized board members are knowledgeable about the situation
and business of the company (Cools, 2014). Ylinen (2013) concluded that stable,
prosperous banks and good development outcomes contribute to national prosperity,
improved welfare, and better standards of living for employees, local businesses, and
shareholders.
Board members have a fiduciary duty—a legal obligation of loyalty—to represent
shareholders and maximize shareholder return (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Fiduciary
duty is meant to ensure there is a reduced risk of valuable information being disclosed to
others and that directors are strong advocates of stakeholder interests (Kim & Ozdemir,
2014). Board monitoring of the CEO is more easily achieved when the board has the
expertise to process the information and render informed decisions (Tian, 2014). To this
end, board members must be capable, knowledgeable, and willing to perform their duties
(Tian, 2014). Board variables such as experience, education, part-time and full-time
member status, attendance at meetings, age, the dual role of CEO and board chair,
independence, and diversity are all important (Baulkaran, 2014; Hemphill & Laurence,
2014; Krause et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Nohel et al., 2014).
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This review of professional and academic literature addressed the topics of
agency theory, other governance theories, history of the corporate governance problem,
governance initiatives and strategies, current corporate governance challenges, and board
selection criteria. Corporate and bank governance continues to be a topic of great interest
to scholars and economists. Board composition is among the most important factors in
ensuring effective governance; as such, director selection criteria merit the focus of study.
The appropriate research question for this study is, what board selection criteria do
banking leaders use to ensure effective governance?
Agency theory was the appropriate framework to explore effective governance
using a qualitative case study method and design with open-ended interview questions.
External governance is important but relies on a strong internal governance system.
Determining the board selection criteria that ensure effective governance could lead to
better business strategies and increased financial prosperity for all stakeholders. Given
the possibility of the occurrence of future financial crises, director selection criteria are an
important area of research for professionals and academics.
Transition
Section 1 included a discussion of the business problem that CEOs and boards
lack director qualification criteria to create effective strategies for strong corporate
governance. I also discussed the foundation of the study, the background of the corporate
governance problem, and the nature of the study. The research question aligns with the
specific business problem and the interview questions.

63
The conceptual framework applies to the principles of corporate governance and
strategic management. In Section 2, I will address the role of the researcher, participant
selection strategy, research method and design, population and sampling method,
research ethics, data collection instruments, data analysis, reliability, and validity. The
findings of the study will be presented in Section 3. The application of the research to
professional practice, implications for social change, and recommendations for further
research will also be included in Section 3.
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Section 2: The Project
Section 2 will contain a discussion of the research method and design I selected
for this study. I will also provide a description of my role as the researcher relative to
studying the literature, obtaining the perception of participants, and analyzing the
responses. In addition, also included in this section will be discussions of the population,
the role of ethics, the data collection instrument and technique, data analysis, and
reliability and validity. In this study, I obtained and analyzed the perceptions of business
leaders in a California bank. This study was designed to provide insights into optimal
board selection criteria and effective corporate governance strategies.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective
governance. The targeted population comprised of banking leaders in one California bank
who demonstrated governance procedures for selecting board members and effective
governance that ensured that the bank did not experience failures or government bailouts
during the last financial crisis (2007–2009). The findings of this doctoral study have
implications for positive social change, including economic and social benefits through
profitable corporations to stakeholders, communities, and the economy as a whole. The
social benefits may include enhancing self-worth when individuals remain employed in
solvent corporations and promoting stable thriving families and communities.
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Role of the Researcher
Prior to data collection, my role as the researcher in this qualitative study was to
plan the research, select the appropriate design, conduct the literature review, and
understand and identify the gaps in the literature. Academic integrity requires an
acknowledgment of existing literature (Luce, McGill, & Peracchio, 2012). My role
during the data collection was to conduct semistructured interviews with participants in
face-to-face settings, via Internet chat sessions, or by telephone.
In my current professional and personal roles, I had no relationship to the topic or
firms on which this study was focused. I conducted this study in full compliance with
ethical principles, such as those provided in the Belmont Report (see Mikesell, Bromley,
& Khodyakov, 2013), to protect the rights and well-being of the research participants. I
completed the National Institute of Health web-based training course on “Protecting
Human Research Participants” on November 09, 2014 with Certificate Number 1614488.
In this study, I respected participants according to the precepts of the Belmont Report. As
part of protecting the rights of potential participants and actual participants, I provided
them with sufficient information about the study and allowed them to make an
independent decision about whether to participate (see Mikesell et al., 2013). Strategies I
used to mitigate bias during data collection included asking questions that were not meant
to elicit a particular answer, not asking questions that prevented the participant from
freely articulating his or her own perceptions, and not driving participants to
predetermined conclusions (see Boatright, 2013).
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The purpose of research is to determine the truth (Boatright, 2013), and it is
important to be ethical in all phases and practices to have a credible study. In terms of
situational biases, I would be remiss if I did not clarify the impact of the largest economic
recession since the Great Depression on me. Likewise, I acknowledge my worldview is
that some individuals with fiduciary responsibility did not perform their duties to the
fullest extent. Recognizing this bias from the outset enabled me to prepare to undertake
research while removing my bias. My clarification of these biases lends authenticity to
my study.
It is important for the researcher to be cognizant of reflexivity, which is the active
acknowledgement by the researcher that his or her own actions and decisions will
inevitably have an impact on the meaning and context of the experience under
investigation (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015). When undertaking the research work, I
bracketed my feelings about the issues; utilized my ability to develop and maintain a
stance of curiosity toward the data; and engaged in reflexivity to self-monitor the impact
of my biases, beliefs, and personal experiences relative to the research (see Berger,
2013). I provided an informed consent form to all participants before initiating data
collection through interviews.
A qualitative research interview involves gathering information and facts,
eliciting stories, and learning about experiences (Rossetto, 2014). The semistructured
interview protocol is commonly used in case study research (Yin, 2014). A researcher
uses an interview protocol to set expectations, uses an interview log, and determines an
appropriate location (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). This form of interviewing resembles the
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guided interview rather than a process of structured queries; in conducting semistructured
interviews, the interviewer poses a stream of questions in a fluid or unstructured manner
(Yin, 2014). I followed some suggestions from literature (Rossetto, 2014; Jacob &
Furgerson, 2012; Yin, 2014) by gathering information, utilizing an interview protocol and
asking the participant’s interview questions and some follow-up questions. The
semistructured interview was ideal for exploring participants’ overall perceptions
regarding utilizing corporate governance in strategy formulation and execution as it
enables follow-up questions.
Participants
Board characteristics play an important role in organizations by improving the
corporate governance of the organization (Hassan, Marimuthu, & Kaur Johl, 2015). In
this study, the participants represented various positions on board membership, selection
committees, and executive leadership. The eligibility criteria for the study participants
were knowledge about the selection criteria necessary for board membership and
successful governance of the bank. Other eligibility criteria for the study participants
included board members, selection committee members of the bank, and bank leadership
who had been associated with the bank for at least 3 years at the time of the study. Board
characteristics are key determinants of several corporate decisions (Iqbal et al., 2015).
Consequently, for good governance, banks and companies need a mix of female and male
directors who possess the appropriate competencies (i.e., knowledge, skills, and
experience) to contribute to board decision making (Elms et al., 2015).
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I began this study by obtaining permission from the Walden University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct this research. Upon obtaining permission
from the IRB, I contacted executives of the target bank by mail and by visiting the bank
to obtain assistance in contacting members of the board of directors. I initiated contact
with the potential participants through surface mail, e-mail, and with telephone calls until
I received a response. My strategy for gaining access to participants was through an
initial contact to invite business leaders to participate in the study. The next recruitment
step was sending consent letters by regular mail to each participant and establishing
interview dates and times. Ultimately, I interviewed them over the phone.
Technology has transformed the interviewing process, enabling researchers to
reduce costs and increase the reach of data collection via telephones (Lord, Bolton,
Fleming, & Anderson, 2016). In developing a working relationship with the leaders who
accepted my invitation to participate in the study, I explained the nature and objectives of
the research, obtained informed consent, coordinated schedule availability for the
interview, and provided updates on the progress of my research. Interviews are often used
in qualitative research, and semistructured interviews are appropriate as they enable
follow-up questions and often produce comprehensive responses (Dresch et al., 2015).
I used open ended questions to interview the participants. The use of open-ended
questions would be best for obtaining comprehensive responses from participants (Starr,
2014). To establishing a working relationship, I engaged in rapport with the participants,
conducted the interviews, provided my contact information, and Walden University’s
contact information with approval information for the study. Interviewing is a data

69
collection method often used in combination with other methods to develop a better
account of the empirical phenomenon (McNulty, Zattoni, & Douglas, 2013).
Research Method and Design
The researcher typically chooses from three categories of research methods
commonly used in a doctoral study: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods (Yin,
2014). The qualitative researcher is focused on applied and theoretical findings or
discoveries, based on research questions through field study in natural conditions (Park &
Park, 2016). Quantitative researchers rely on the testing of hypotheses to achieve the
research goals in controlled and contrived studies (Park & Park, 2016). Mixed methods
research combines quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study (Venkatesh,
Brown, & Bala, 2013). The research question, constraints, and type of participants are
important determinants of the appropriate methodological and design choice (Malsch &
Salterio, 2016).
Research Method
A research method is a guide for researchers to follow in the search for necessary
answers to the research problem (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). To study this
business problem of agency conflict and corporate governance, I used the qualitative
research method, which is a holistic research approach that allows the researcher to
synthesize data from multiple perspectives and extend that synthesis to create knowledge
and leverage that knowledge in creative ways (see Singh, 2015). Through my study, I
explored board selection criteria and strategies that ensure effective governance. The
defining characteristics of qualitative research are (a) data collection in the natural field
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setting, (b) the researcher as key to data collection, (c) multiple sources of data, (d) focus
on the meanings of participants’ responses, and (e) interpretive inquiry and holistic
account (McNulty, Zattoni et al., 2013). The qualitative research method is best for
exploring the perceptions of participants (Starr, 2014).
Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, and Mitchell (2014) wrote that the quantitative
method allows for the study of a sample and the generalization of findings from that
sample to the population through statistical analysis. This method could be used to collect
and analyze data that represent trends, historical numbers, and allow for the comparison
of variables (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). Bhattacherjee (2012) pointed out that the
quantitative method is the most appropriate research technique to determine if a
relationship exists between variables. The quantitative method is a rigorous research
approach, appropriate for testing hypotheses about the relationship between a studies'
independent and dependent variables (Bettis et al., 2014). The quantitative method was
not appropriate for this study as I did not test a hypothesis or compare variables.
A mixed methods approach was not appropriate for this study as this approach is a
preferred method when neither the qualitative nor the quantitative method alone could
sufficiently answer the research question (Venkatesh et al., 2013). A chief aim of my
study was to explore board selection criteria that promote effective governance. The
research question and purpose statement are important factors in the choice of the
research methodology from among quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods. The
qualitative method was best for gathering experiences and obtaining comprehensive
responses (see Dresch et al., 2015).
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Research Design
In this study, I used a case study design to determine and propose board selection
criteria that contribute toward effective governance. A case study design should be
considered (a) to answer how and why questions, (b) to cover contextual conditions, (c)
when a researcher cannot manipulate participants’ behavior, or (d) when the boundaries
are not clear between phenomenon and context (Yin, 2014). The main objectives of the
case design are to explore, describe, and explain (Dresch et al., 2015).
In this study, I chose to undertake a single case study, which was critical to my
conceptual theory and used to determine whether the propositions are correct or whether
an alternative set of explanations might be more relevant (see Yin, 2014). The rationale
for undertaking a single case study includes an extreme or an unusual case and the
revelatory case (Yin, 2014). A single case can contribute to knowledge and theory
building by confirming, challenging, or extending the theory (Yin, 2014). A single case is
ideal in management research when revelatory or exemplary data are sought or when the
study offers opportunities for unusual research access (Mariotto, Pinto Zanni, & De
Moraes, 2014). A single case study is also ideal in a revelatory case that can contribute to
knowledge (Yin, 2014). A single case could also help to determine whether an alternative
set of explanations might be more relevant (Yin, 2014).
I had several other qualitative design options. The phenomenological approach is
used to study the way a person lives, creates, and relates in the world (Conklin, 2013).
Phenomenology can be employed to understand shared human experience because the
design focuses on the participants’ experiences and meaning (Conklin, 2013). On the
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other hand, ethnographic designs are appropriate for studying a group in which members
share a culture (Hampshire, 2014). Neither phenomenological nor ethnographical designs
were appropriate for studying board selection criteria that promote effective governance.
A phenomenological design was not appropriate as the purpose of this study was not to
explore the way people live or share their lived experiences. Ethnographical design was
not an appropriate design as in this study, I did not focus on a group in which members
share a culture.
A key to conducting a case study is reaching data saturation. Data saturation is
said to occur when no new data are obtained from additional interviews (Houghton,
Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). The number of interviews that should be conducted is
not as important as achieving data saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015). The objective of the
interview process is not about the numbers per se, but about rich (quality) and thick
(quantity) data, structuring interview questions to ensure the researcher asks multiple
participants the same questions, and interviewing the people that one would not normally
consider (Fusch & Ness, 2015).
Population and Sampling
The population was comprised of 10 leaders at a single bank in California, eight
board members, the executive vice president, and chief information officer. The financial
crisis of 2007–2009 engulfed the banking system of the United States before spreading
around the world (Bordo, Redish, & Rockoff, 2015). Few banks escaped adverse
outcomes and financial loss resulting from the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Paulet et al.,
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2015). A single case and focus on a single bank sufficed to highlight the selection criteria
for board membership and the governance strategies that may be emulated by others.
I interviewed four business leaders from the bank to achieve data saturation.
The interviewees were current board members and executive vice presidents. The owners
of banking institutions appoint board members to provide high-level oversight within the
organization (Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). A case study interview requires the
researcher to operate on two levels at the same time: satisfying the needs of the line of
inquiry and simultaneously putting forth friendly and nonthreatening questions in the
open-ended interview (Yin, 2014).
The four business leaders with knowledge of the bank’s selection criteria were
chosen through purposeful sampling. The participants in this study have at least 3 years’
association with the bank. Purposeful sampling method could be used to select
participants likely to provide relevant information (Palinkas et al., 2013). Purposeful
sampling is based upon meeting inclusion criteria such as required knowledge and
information in which elements are selected from the target population on the basis of
their fit with the purpose of the study (Robinson, 2014). For this study, I used confirming
and disconfirming purposeful sampling to confirm the importance and meaning of
possible patterns and check out the viability of emergent findings with new data (Palinkas
et al., 2013) was appropriate. Conducting purposeful sampling of business leaders
allowed me to interview individuals who have knowledge on the selection criteria for
board members that promote effective governance. It is important to focus on
interviewing individuals who have the authority or the knowledge to offer useful insights
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and comments on the research topic (Rowley, 2012). The population selected aligns with
the overarching research question.
Ethical Research
The study of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context obligates a
researcher to important ethical practices akin to those followed in medical research (Yin,
2014). Informed consent is a key element for protecting the welfare of research
participants, as established by the Nuremberg Code; in addition, the Helsinki Declaration
underscored the importance of having an ethics committee review a research proposal,
which includes an informed consent form (Kumar & Singh, 2013). The informed consent
form contains Walden University’s approval number 03-23-17-0465001 for this doctoral
study. Consent to participate in research was an important component of conducting an
ethical research study that involves human participants (Braunack-Mayer et al., 2015).
The informed consent process included providing information in written form and
explaining the form. Participants were required to sign an informed consent form prior to
interviewing them (see Appendix B). The informed consent form contains Walden
University’s approval number for this doctoral study.
The form includes the purpose of the research and the proposed process, as well
as the methods the researcher will use to maintain privacy. Participants in a study must be
assured of privacy and confidentiality (Dekking, van der Graaf, & van Delden, 2014). I
assured participants that the information being sought was for research purpose only and
ensured their anonymity by labeling participants as P1 through P4. A researcher is
responsible for conducting a case study with special care and sensitivity (Yin, 2014). The
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interviews did not include the individual participants’ or the bank name and will be used
only for the doctoral research study. The informed consent form also explained the
expectations of participation, the withdrawal process, ethical principles that I followed,
and an affirmation of the individual’s rights to understand a study before agreeing to
participate (Knepp, 2014). An informed consent form must emphasize the voluntary
nature of participation (Dekking et al., 2014). I provided each participant a copy of the
informed consent form. The informed consent agreement used for this study and
interview records are in a locked filing cabinet to which only I would have access for 5
years.
As part of the informed consent process, I explained to potential participants that
they may withdraw from the study at any time of their choosing. The National Institute of
Health issues a certificate upon completion of a course for conducting studies involving
the collection of sensitive information. I completed this course of study. This course of
study explains that no incentives should be offered to participants. I did not offer any
incentives for participating in this study. I took all necessary measures to ensure adequate
ethical protection of participants.
A researcher must be ethical in all practices (Boatright, 2013). I sought
clarification and explored data objectively, remembering that a primary purpose of
undertaking research is to find the truth. Interviews should be free of prejudices and
presuppositions (Tosey, Lawley, & Meese, 2014). Ethical practices include taking care
when identifying themes to ensure that each theme is actually represented in the
transcripts being analyzed and not a product of the researcher’s misinterpretation
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(Rodham et al., 2015). I followed ethical practices throughout the process of conducting
the research, ensuring the undertaking is completed without allowing my worldview to
influence or temper my assumptions.
I maintained all data on a password-protected external drive to which only I have
access. These data will be maintained for 5 years to protect confidential information,
including the identity of participants. After 5 years, I will shred the documents and
destroy the external drive containing research data. The final doctoral manuscript
includes the Walden IRB approval number. I ensured that the document does not include
names or any other identifiable information of individuals or organizations.
Data Collection Instruments
I was the primary collection instrument in this study. A researcher undertaking a
qualitative case study is the primary data collection instrument (Turner & Norwood,
2013). Case study evidence includes archival records and interviews (Yin, 2014). Silic
and Back (2013) utilized open-ended questions within semistructured interviews to
explore perceptions on governance. According to Yin (2014), semistructured interviews
and company document analysis are common sources of evidence in case studies.
Semistructured interviews are an appropriate way for the researcher to focus on the
details that address the research question (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I employed a single
case study design and conducted semistructured interviews to explore board selection
criteria that promote corporate governance from the perspective of business leaders in a
single bank in California.
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Participants offered answers to a series of preliminary questions. The interviews
began with my introducing myself and stating the purpose of the research; I asked
permission to record the interview and assure the participant of confidentiality. The
participants declined to permit the recording of the interviews. Documentation is a key
aspect of data collection (Yin, 2014). I documented the responses from the interviews in a
Microsoft Word document that is easy for storage and retrieval.
I also collected secondary data for this study. Secondary data could support other
significant findings in a study (Hensmans, 2015). Secondary data collection included an
examination of publicly available archival documents with financial reports and business
journals. These data, such as board membership and company annual financial
information, was collected from the bank website, the EDGAR database (an online
resource maintained by the SEC), and data from the Hoover’s database maintained by
Dun & Bradstreet. Secondary data could proffer adequate data required for undertaking
rigorous research, even though it may exist for other purposes. Kaufman and Hwang
(2015) triangulated their study’s data with secondary data to collaborate the open-ended
interview responses in their case study on two French banks operating in the United
States. Brown (2015) collected secondary data in his qualitative case study of financial
crimes to support interview responses.
Member checking is a technique to validate the researcher’s interpretation of the
interview data collected; the process enhances the academic rigor of the study and allows
for additional data to be collected in the form of corrections or modifications to the data
previously collected during the interview (Harvey, 2015). Member checking is when a
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researcher shares the interpretation of the participant’s responses with the participants to
confirm that it represents their answer and validates the findings (Tong, Chapman, Israni,
Gordon, & Craig, 2013). I conducted member checking to enhance the reliability of the
interview responses and triangulate the interview results with information available
through publicly available company archival documents.
Member checking helped to confirm participants intended responses and validate
my interpretation. A researcher may triangulate by using multiple sources of data to
enhance the reliability of their study (Trangkanont & Charoenngam, 2014). I used (a)
semistructured interviews with open-ended questions, (b) bank archival documents, (c)
financial reports, (d) business journals and (e) methodological triangulation to enhance
the reliability and validity of my research.
Data Collection Technique
My data sources are semistructured interviews with open-ended questions, bank
archival documents, financial reports, and business journals. Semistructured interviews
are used by researchers to pose additional follow-up questions to delve more deeply into
participants’ experiences and knowledge (Dresch et al., 2015). Secondary data such as
bank archival documents, financial reports, and business journals are useful for validation
(Venkatesh et al., 2013).
Primary methods for data collection in case studies are semistructured and
unstructured interviews (Yin, 2014). In conducting semistructured interviews, the
researcher poses open-ended questions and, if necessary, asks additional probing
questions to gain deeper insight into participants’ knowledge and experience (Dresch et
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al., 2015). Semistructured interviewing is appropriate for gathering comprehensive
responses (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I followed Rowley’s (2012) protocol and process,
which included the design and planning of the interview process that I used for
conducting the interviews. According to Rowley, the researcher’s initial contact with
potential participants is important. The quality of the initial e-mail message, telephone
call, or letter is key to study success.
Jacob and Furgerson (2012) advocated that first-time qualitative researchers use
an interview protocol to assist them in collecting data. I followed the steps Jacob and
Furgerson recommended, arranging interviews in an ideal location or medium, being
willing to make instant revisions to the interview protocol, and keeping the interview
within reasonable time limits. The researcher must be clear as to the amount of time that
the interview will take, capture the interest of the interviewee, and follow-up if the initial
contact does not provoke a response (Rowley, 2012).
Face-to-face interviews allow a researcher to obtain both verbal and nonverbal
cues (Rowley, 2012). Disadvantages of interviewing include the time required to travel to
conduct multiple interviews, the cost, and the difficulty of discussing sensitive topics
when face-to-face (Lord et al., 2016). If a researcher has difficulty obtaining agreement
from potential interviewees to meet for face-to-face interviews, the researcher should
consider telephone, Skype, or even e-mail interviews (Rowley, 2012). The anonymity of
telephone interviews may be more conducive for discussing sensitive issues than face-toface interactions (Lord et al., 2016). I took extensive notes during the interviews and read
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the responses back to the participants to validate the interview and mailed the interview
notes to each participant to complete member checking.
Secondary data in the form of publicly available company documents was also
collected as part of this study. Secondary data are important for corroboration and
triangulation in a research study (Hensmans, 2015). Secondary data could be used to
confirm and disconfirm data and information (Hensmans, 2015). Qualitative secondary
data entail the use of existing data to develop new scientific understanding (Irwin, 2013).
The disadvantages of using secondary data are that the data may not be an accurate
portrayal of existing information (Irwin, 2013). I utilized reliable secondary data derived
from public available sources: data from the website of the bank, document analysis, and
archival records of past performance. I triangulated secondary data with participant
interviews to corroborate participants’ responses. Robeson and O'Connor (2013) used
secondary data to determine the effect of governance board on firms' performance
through innovation.
Once collected, data were coded and analyzed with qualitative data analysis
software. I explored key themes from interview responses and related those themes to
information from the literature review regarding corporate governance. I used
methodological triangulation to explore whether the documentation supports the findings
from the interviews. Finally, I determined how the themes relate to the conceptual
framework of the study. Researchers using case study design could use methodological
triangulation to perceive all the facets of the data, extrapolate the meaning inherent in the
data and to compare and analyze the same empirical events (Denzin, 2012).

81
Data Organization Technique
I did not record the interviews due to the participants taking exception to being
recorded. I took detailed notes in Microsoft Word documents during the calls. Secondary
data in this study included publicly available data such as company financial statements,
governance documents from the website of the bank, data from the EDGAR database,
and data from the Hoover’s database. Using computers for qualitative data analysis, also
known as computer-assisted qualitative data analysis, has many advantages, including
identifying relevant quotations on the computer screen and coding using virtual-colored
stripes (Odena, 2013).
I utilized qualitative data analysis software application to identify the themes,
facilitate coding, and to analyze data. Qualitative software can help the researcher to
develop and renegotiate insights from theory and interview data, as well as enhance
trustworthiness, transparency, and publication potential (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012).
Data for each analysis are kept safe but accessible to enable retrieval, along with other
data and documents in workbooks that will be stored on a password-protected external
drive. When not in use, the external drive will be kept in a locked filing cabinet to which
only I would have access. The external drive will be kept for 5 years following the
completion of this study, after which it will be destroyed.
Data Analysis
Data analysis included methodological triangulation. Methodological
triangulation involves using more than one kind of data to study a phenomenon,
comparing multiple data sources to confirm and make findings credible (Fusch & Ness,
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2015; Houghton et al., 2013). Hoque, Covaleski, and Gooneratne (2013) defined
triangulation as the usage of data from different sources in the study of the same
phenomenon; triangulation is important for credibility and validation. These data were
collected and analyzed to allow for data triangulation. I achieved data saturation by using
different sources of information: semistructured interviews with open-ended questions,
bank archival documents, financial reports, and business journals. I used Yin’s (2014)
data analysis approach: (a) compiling, (b) disassembling, (c) reassembling, (d)
interpreting the meaning and (e) drawing conclusions from the data.
Compiling
Compiling data is the documentation and organization of the data (Yin, 2014).
The primary research question for this qualitative research study was: What board
selection criteria do banking leaders use to ensure effective governance? Effective
governance structures are essential to achieving and maintaining public trust and
confidence in the banking system, as well as ensuring the proper functioning of the
banking sector and the economy as a whole (Leventis et al., 2013).
To answer the research question, I interviewed four business leaders affiliated
with a single bank in California. I compiled data through semistructured interviews and
open-ended questions. Another source of data for this study was secondary data using
information available through publicly available company archival documents.
Disassembling
Disassembling data is grouping data elements into labels (Yin, 2014). I read the
interview responses and looked for recurring words and phrases then formed categories
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which were relevant to the research questions. I coded the concepts and ideas from the
interviews and secondary data after member checking, then critically analyzed the data
using qualitative data analysis software. Researchers use tags and labels to highlight
different segments of relevant text (Dasgupta, 2015). The logical and sequential process
for the data analysis upon completion of data collection is the transcription, coding with
qualitative software application to identify the themes, and data analysis (Odena, 2013).
There is software specifically designed to analyze qualitative text (Sinkovics &
Alfoldi, 2012). I used available software to analyze rich textural data from the interviews,
themes from the literature review regarding corporate governance, and the conceptual
framework of the study, agency theory. Researchers may utilize the comment feature in
Microsoft Word to highlight codes (Cater, Machtmes, & Fox, 2013). I used the comment
feature in Microsoft Word to highlight codes. Systematic analysis aided by software
supported my ability to manage and retrieve the various types of data (e.g., transcripts
and notes) across some data sets and increase the possibilities to substantiate research
claims in qualitative data analysis (Odena, 2013).
Reassembling
Reassembling is conducted by categorizing data into groups (Yin, 2014). A
researcher conducts qualitative content analysis on the themes that emerge from the
interview transcripts (Schreier, 2012). This method of analysis is one of the several
qualitative methods available for analyzing data and interpreting its meaning (Schreier,
2012). The approach represents a systematic and objective means of describing and
quantifying phenomena, especially aspects described in interview transcripts.

84
During the categorization, the groups of themes in the data became evident.
Reassembling includes the categorization of the themes in the interview transcripts
(Schreier, 2012) and the secondary data. Microsoft Word has tools that aid in analyzing
text (Seidman, 2013). Sorting of data is a proven method for the identification of
prevailing themes (Bishop & Lexchin, 2013). I took stock of themes that emerged from
secondary data and input them into an Excel spreadsheet. I coded the key words from the
interview responses and input them into an Excel spreadsheet. I analyzed the document
themes with the themes and key words from interviews. The categorization is crucial in
the interpretation of the data in enumerating significant findings. The categorization
helped to identify the major categories and compelling themes in the study.
Interpretation
The interpretation stage involves creating narratives from the data (Yin, 2014).
This analysis confirmed the participants’ responses to interview questions such as board
composition, separation of the role of the CEO and board chair. It included the general
performance of the bank within the past several years, including the period of the 2007–
2009 financial crisis.
I focused on the recurring themes from the interviews, relating the key themes
with the existing and new literature that emerges before final project acceptance. I also
related the themes to the conceptual framework, agency theory. I utilized methodological
triangulation to confirm or to find inconsistencies between semistructured interview
responses, member checking, and company archival records.
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Concluding
Concluding involves the original research question, the data, discussion, and
interpretation of the findings (Yin, 2014). It includes significant findings and the lessons
learned in the study. Concluding involves drawing conclusions from the data (Yin, 2014).
This section of the study includes statements that describe the outcome of a research and
new insights.
A study’s conclusion reveals the key findings, the significance of the theory, and
the need for future studies (Goldberg & Allen, 2015). I related the key themes with recent
studies on corporate governance and conceptual framework. I observed the frequency of
the themes, analyze and reported my findings.
Reliability and Validity
Reliability and validity are important in research. In a doctoral study, reliability
and validity are the difference between having an acceptable study that could provide
guidance to scholars and practitioners or a study that is challenged and rejected. The
trustworthiness of qualitative content analysis is also often presented by using terms such
as credibility, dependability, conformability, transferability, and authenticity (Elo et al.,
2014).
Reliability
Reliability of a research study is dependent upon consistent information,
appropriate and reliable research methods and procedures, meticulous documentation,
unambiguous research questions, and a comprehensive research plan (Kihn & Ihantola,
2015). Dependability in qualitative research indicates the consistency of the research data
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(Houghton et al., 2013). Dependability is similar to reliability and refers to the
consistency of findings across time and researchers (Hays, Wood, Dahl, & Kirk-Jenkins,
2016).
I attained dependability through adequate documentation, maintaining an audit
trail of my research study, and conducting member checking to ensure rigorous data
interpretation (Houghton et al., 2013). I conducted member checking to ensure the
dependability of the data. Member checking involves sharing the interpretation of the
participants’ interview responses with the participants to confirm that it represents their
answer (Tong et al., 2013). Member checking allows modifications and validation of the
data (Harvey, 2015).
Validity
Validity refers to the legitimacy of the findings and the extent to which data are
plausible, credible, and defensible when challenged (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Secondary
data from other sources enables validation. To ensure validity, the researcher must report
how the results were created, enabling readers to clearly follow the analysis and resulting
conclusions (Schreier, 2012). Credibility involves the focus of the research and refers to
confidence in how well the data address the intended focus (Houghton et al., 2013). To
ensure credibility, I used triangulation with semistructured interviews, member checking,
and company archival records. Credibility is the overall believability of a study (Hays et
al., 2016). The research effort was dedicated to answering the research question.
Transferability occurs when details of the study are captured and the outcomes
and findings have meaning to others in similar situations (El Hussein, Jakubec, & Osuji,
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2015). Transferability is attainable when there is sufficient information to replicate the
study by future researchers (Houghton et al., 2013). The burden of demonstrating that a
set of findings applies to another context rests with future researchers rather than the
original researcher (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Confirmability relates to the accuracy
or accurate reflections of participants’ perspectives without researchers’ views interfering
with findings (Hays et al., 2016). Confirmability is reflected in the analysis and findings
of a research study and I substantiated the confirmability of the study through member
checking (Cope, 2014).
Data saturation is attained when there is no new theme emerging from the
interview data and documentation (Liu, 2014). A method of attaining data saturation is
asking multiple participants the same questions (Fusch & Ness, 2015). I asked four
participants the same questions and utilized follow-up questions. Triangulation is the
convergence of data from different sources to determine the consistency and credibility of
a finding (Yin, 2014). According to Fusch and Ness (2015), triangulation strategies
enable a researcher to check for the existence of new relationships. Collecting and
analyzing data from different sources enables triangulation (Trangkanont &
Charoenngam, 2014).
Transition and Summary
Section 2 included discussions of the role of the researcher, the participants,
population and sampling, data collection, data analysis, and ethical research
consideration. In Section 3, I will document the research findings, analysis, and results. In
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addition, Section 3 will include information on the application to business practice,
possible implications for social change, and reflections.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore strategies to
improve board selection criteria that banking leaders use to promote effective
governance. Data collection involved my semistructured interviews with four business
leaders who had a minimum of 3 years’ association with the bank and possessed
knowledge on the selection criteria for board membership at the bank. Data included
interview responses as well as publicly available archival documents with financial
reports and business journals. I conducted a comprehensive analysis of this data, which
involved examining and comparing the data from different sources (see Marshall &
Rossman, 2016). This section will include (a) the presentation of the findings, (b)
application to professional practice, (c) implications for social change, (d)
recommendations for action, (e) recommendations for further research, (f) reflections,
and (g) the conclusion.
In this study, I explored board selection criteria that promoted corporate
governance from the perspective of business leaders in a bank in California. The bank has
experienced growth in its history. It did not have losses during the recent recession as the
annual reports indicated increasing growth and the bank has had more than 100
consecutive quarters of profitability. The financial and annual reports were available on
the bank’s website under the investor and financial information link.
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Presentation of the Findings
The purpose of this study was to answer one overarching research question: What
strategies do banking leaders use to identify board selection criteria to ensure effective
governance? Four themes emerged from the participant responses and documents
reviewed. The themes were: (a) select independent, experienced, and knowledgeable
business leaders as board members; (b) recognize the importance of the choice of the
CEO and other senior executives; (c) acknowledge cooperation is key to sustainable
growth; and (d) promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board membership
criteria.
The participants in this study were four business leaders and board members of a
California community bank. Two were executive vice presidents and two were board
members. All the participants were knowledgeable about the bank’s board selection
criteria. During the semistructured interviews, which all occurred by telephone and lasted
for an average of 30 minutes, each participant answered a series of seven open-ended
questions that I posed to them. Technology has enabled researchers to increase the reach
of data collection via telephones (Lord et al., 2016). Telephone interviews are a genuine
alternative to face-to-face interviews in that they offer greater anonymity and enable
participants to control the privacy of the conversation (Irvine, Drew, & Sainsbury, 2013).
The participants would not permit me to record the interviews. In the interviews, I
asked probing questions, took extensive notes, read the answers provided to each
question to each participant to verify the accuracy of my notes, and mailed a succinct
synthesis to each participant to confirm the information captured. I coded the participants
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using assigned codes P1 through P4. Participants P1 and P2 served as vice presidents and
Participants P3 and P4 served as board members. I interpreted the resulting data with
thematic analysis. Thematic analysis enables a researcher to identify important patterns
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). Recurring themes emerged in the secondary
data including publicly available archival documents with financial reports and business
journals regarding the strategies that banking leaders use to identify board selection
criteria to ensure effective governance. Recurring themes were (a) independence, (b)
vigilance and ability to monitor management, (c) diversity, (d) financial knowledge, (e)
separating the roles of CEO and board chair, (f) full-time board membership, (g) small
board size, (h) term limits for board members, (i) age limit for board members, and (j)
ethics.
Key Words
After undertaking the interviews, I compiled a list of recurring keywords in the
responses. The word CEO was the most frequently used (f = 32), followed by executive (f
= 31). These support a conclusion that the CEO and top executives are paramount to
effective governance. All participants mentioned the importance of the partnership
between the board and senior executives. According to P1, the partnership between the
board and executives has been the key to the bank’s success. The keywords of experience
(f = 19), leadership (f = 12), integrity (f = 11), knowledge (f = 10), and ethics (f = 5)
revealed important criteria for board selection. Other keywords included monitor (f = 10),
independent (f = 7), oversight (f = 4), and supervise (f = 4), which supported the
important function of monitoring.
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Theme 1: Select Independent, Experienced, and Knowledgeable Business Leaders as
Board Members
The first theme that emerged from the analysis was to select independent,
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members. I identified
independence as part of the conceptual framework for this study. According to Jensen
and Meckling (1976), the primary role of the board is to monitor managerial performance
due to the inherent conflict of interest between executives and shareholders. According to
the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for the bank, dated February 2016, a
principal goal of the board is to optimize independent perspectives, give advice to the
CEO and management, increase the quality of board oversight, and lessen the possibility
of conflicts of interest.
Board members’ independence is an essential requirement for controlling
management and protecting shareholder value (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). P1 noted that all
the board members except the CEO are independent, and they review the knowledge and
experience required due to vacancy and business needs. According to the nominating and
corporate governance guidelines for the bank dated February 2016, board members seek
a broad range of skills, expertise, industry knowledge, and contacts useful to the
company’s business. Additionally, every interviewee (100%) noted that independence is
a primary requirement for board membership and effective governance. P3 remarked that
board members are entrusted with the strategic initiatives of the bank and held
responsible for providing high-level oversight to the executive team.
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Seven of the eight board members at the community bank are independent board
members. A director is independent if no immediate family member is employed by the
firm and they have not been an employee of the firm or auditing firm (Conyon, 2014).
According to agency theory, board members should be able to monitor management, and
because they are expected to monitor and guide executives, their independence is critical
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). P4 explained that board members are independent and have
supervisory responsibilities over the executives of the bank. According to Nordberg and
McNulty (2013), the primary responsibilities of board members are monitoring, external
affiliation, and guidance.
The experience and knowledge of the executive and board members are intended
to promote governance while also guiding investments (Yuan et al., 2014). According to
P2, the vacuum created on the board determines the criteria for the selection of new board
members. All board members and the CEO are accomplished and have had strong
leadership experience. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines
for the bank, dated February 2016, all directors are expected to be knowledgeable about
the company and its industry. P1 shared that business leadership is “top on the list” as
board members utilize their insights and experience to advance shareholder value.
According to agency theory, a small board is usually more efficient than a large
board because of a decrease in agency conflicts, effective communication, and lower
operation costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The bank has a small board with a total of
eight board members. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines
for the bank, dated February 2016, the board should be comprised of a sufficient number
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of directors to enable the board to properly perform its responsibilities and achieve its
governance objectives and goals. The company’s bylaws currently provide that the board
will consist of between seven and 13 members.
My findings around this theme confirmed the existing literature. Agency theory
suggests that small boards are more efficient because they are better coordinated and
have less internal conflicts (Switzer & Wang, 2013). According to the nominating and
corporate governance guidelines, the board should be small enough to permit meaningful
participation by each director, substantive discussions of the entire board, and large
enough that committee work does not become unduly burdensome. Companies with
smaller boards have lower agency costs (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016). As for board size,
my findings were consistent with the major assumption: Companies with smaller boards
have lower agency costs (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016).
P3 explained that performance as directors and the board are evaluated annually
as stipulated by the shareholders and an important performance criterion is promoting
shareholder value. According to the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for
the bank, dated February 2016, the board believes it is important to monitor overall board
performance, to address changing needs of the company, and to bring fresh perspectives
to the challenges facing the company as circumstances warrant. According to Form 10-K
from the SEC’s (2017) EDGAR System, during 2016, the board of directors declared
quarterly cash dividends.
There is no CEO duality at the study site community bank as the CEO is not the
chair of the board. Agency theorists have asserted that there is greater board
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independence when the roles of CEO and chair of the board are separate (Sarpal, 2014).
Board attendance decreases with multiple directorships (Lin et al., 2014). P2 expressed
that nominees should not be currently serving on more than two other boards and must be
capable of attending scheduled board and committee meetings.
Theme 2: Recognize the Importance of the Choice of the CEO and Other Senior
Executives
Another theme that emerged from this study was that the choice of the CEO and
other senior executives are critical to effective corporate governance. Most literature on
corporate governance focused on the role of the board, duties, responsibilities,
composition, structure, shareholder rights and activism, executive compensation, and
diversity. The study site bank's corporate governance focuses on the board as well as
senior executives. According to the bank's corporate governance guidelines, the
compensation committee conducts an annual review of the president and CEO’s
performance to ensure that the officers are providing the best leadership for the bank in
the long and short-term.
Board practices designed to achieve long-term utility are central to the
prescription of agency theory to protect owners' interests (Conheady et al., 2015).
Protection of shareholders’ interests is in line with the agency theory. There has been far
less focus in research focus in the field on the importance of the CEO and other senior
executives in corporate governance. In reality, corporate governance in banks involves
the boards and senior executives both accountable to shareholders, who must collaborate
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in providing strategic decision making, compliance with laws, and protection of
depositors (Leventis et al., 2013).
In my search within Walden University’s library using the term corporate
governance on Business Source Complete with delimiters, the full text and peer-reviewed
scholarly journals from 2013 to date, yielded more than 4,740 results. Boards and
directors yielded 2,580 articles and chief executive officer and CEO as a subject term
yielded 762 (see Table 1). Clearly, most articles have focused on board members (54%)
as the most important factor in corporate governance.
Table 1
Corporate Governance Literature Research Themes
Variable
Board
Directors

Frequency
1436

Percentage
30.0

1144

24.0

CEO

762

16.0

Audit

473

10.0

Regulations

925

20.0

4740

100.0

Total

Many of the corporate governance problems in the past related to greed by
executives, lapses in judgment, and executive discretion (i.e., Enron, Adelphia,
WorldCom; Darrat et al., 2016). However, most researchers still focused on the board.
Boards of directors complement the regulatory oversight of executives (Henderson,
2013). The bank in this case study did not have full-time board members. As explained
by Participant P2, “We do not have full-time board members, and it is inconceivable that
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directors would be informed about all the issues that occur in real-time.” Corporate
governance involves the executives of a firm, its board, its shareholders, and regulatory
agencies (Dermine, 2013).
The CEO is paramount regarding corporate governance. The collective behavior
of corporate leaders is often critical in corporate wrongdoing, and the CEO frequently
plays a central role (Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015). P3 noted that the daily operations of a
bank are the responsibility of the executive management. This is further confirmed by
existing literature. According to Starbuck (2014), it is important to improve executive
management governance.
Directors often face limited access to firm-specific information, and the high cost
of assessing the reliability of information and these limitations reduce their monitoring
effectiveness (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Nordberg and McNulty (2013),
responsible boards of directors take ownership of their role and actively oversee activities
in their firms. While this is important, the role of the CEO is paramount. CEOs have
substantial influence in addition to the explicit legal authority to direct corporate affairs
(Khanna et al., 2015). Business leaders, the board of directors, and audit committees must
maintain the integrity and the public trust (Franzel, 2014).
Theme 3: Acknowledge Cooperation is Key to Sustainable Growth
The third theme was that cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to
sustainable growth. This is confirmed by current literature. In light of past corporate
scandals, companies are paying more attention to corporate governance practices,
particularly aligning the interests of stakeholders and managers to minimize the exposure

98
to the principal-agent problem (Garanina & Kaikova, 2016). The participants’ claim that
cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to sustainable growth disconfirms
the main conceptual theory. P1 declared that “an effective board uses their knowledge
and experience to complement the strategies by the CEO.”
The agency theory demands sufficient monitoring to align agency interests (Fama
& Jensen, 1983). According to agency theory, candidates for board membership should
be selected based on their ability to monitor management (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
However, a recurring theme in the participant interview responses aligned with another
governance theory, the stewardship theory. Under stewardship theory, the relationship
between the board and CEO is cooperative with the board working collaboratively with
the CEO (McNulty, Florakis et al., 2013).
The participants emphasized that collaboration was key to the bank’s success.
According to publicly available bank’s financial disclosures, the bank has demonstrated
strong and sustained financial performance and positive earnings for more than 100
consecutive quarters. Each participant commented that cooperation is the key to their
sustained growth. According to P4, the majority of shareholders, the executive team, and
the board are “on the same page,” as they “all work for and are accountable to the
shareholders.” In addition, as noted in the nominating and corporate governance
guidelines for the bank dated February, 2016, other important factors to be considered by
the nominating committee in the selection of nominees for the position of a director
include ability to work together as an effective group and the ability to commit adequate
time to serve as a director.
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The interview responses supported some assertions that the board may work
cooperatively with the CEO when interests align in pursuance of shareholders’ goals.
Stewardship theory affirms the synergies derivable between members of the board and
CEO, which positively influence organizational performance (Mowbray & Ingley, 2013).
According to the bank’s annual reports, the bank has sustained financial performance and
delivered a cash dividend for more than 100 consecutive quarters. P2 emphasized that the
board and CEO have demonstrated a strong focus on increasing long-term shareholder
value. According to the bank's corporate governance guidelines, the board and CEO’s
performance are assessed on both short and long-term outcomes.
Theme 4: Promote Integrity and Ethics as Key Executive and Board Membership
Criteria
Board member selection criteria are important and include knowledge and
experience (Elms et al., 2015). The CEO is not a member of the nominating committee of
the bank. In the nominating and corporate governance guidelines for the bank dated
February, 2016, the nominating committee shall be comprised of directors who qualify as
independent directors. Integrity as a key executive and board membership is an important
theme that emerged from this study.
Some interviewees made statements that integrity was an important board
selection criterion. According to P2, the articulation of the vision of putting people with
integrity in executive positions to execute is indispensable to effective corporate
governance and success for the bank. As stated in the nominating and corporate
governance guidelines for the bank, another important factor to be considered by the
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nominating committee in the selection of nominees for the position of director is
community involvement.
The importance of integrity was affirmed by P3, who shared that nominees
selected to serve on the board have all demonstrated a reputation for honesty and
adherence to high ethical standards. Unlike the inherent divergence of interests
propounded by the agency problems which is the basis for shareholder calls for boards to
implement effective governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Existing literature confirms
this affirmation. In the area of director selection, proven moral integrity could become a
point to investigate before appointment as a director (Grant & McGhee, 2017). Board of
directors must maintain integrity to uphold the capital market and economic well-being
(Franzel, 2014). The integrity of the board is pivotal to fostering shareholder trust
(Perrault, 2015).
Pitelis (2013) asserted that there should be an ethical dimension in managing the
affairs of the company. The ethical dimension and integrity are more aligned to the
trusteeship theory. In trusteeship theory, executive management and board members
behave transparently and conscientiously (Balasubramanian, 2009). The lack of integrity
of some executive leaders relates to the conceptual theory for this study. The boards of
directors are; therefore, empowered to monitor the CEO and protect shareholders’
interests. Knowledge in the discipline is considered in the selection of the appropriate
directors to undertake this monitoring.
The potential for opportunistic behavior and excessive risk taking by the CEO in
organizations is a primary governance issue (Arce, 2013). Female directors enhance the
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integrity of the board and promote shareholder trust (Perrault, 2015). Board diversity
enhances the integration of different perspectives and allows for better decision making
(Sun et al., 2015). Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) argued that gender-diverse boards are
tougher monitors of CEOs. In this case study, a gender diversity of the bank’s board was
observed: two women and six men. However, no participant mentioned gender diversity
as a selection criterion for board membership.
Corporations with good governance, have boards that are morally accountable to
shareholders (Nohel et al., 2014). P1 explained that “in addition to board membership,
much depends on the quality of the CEO and chief financial officer (CFO).” According to
the bank's corporate governance guidelines, Directors are expected to act ethically at all
times and to acknowledge their adherence to the bank’s Code of Ethics. Encouragement
can be taken from the field of ethical decision making in which studies have found that
certain personal ethical values or value orientations are linked to ethical or unethical
behavior in business (Grant & McGhee, 2017).
The first theme that emerged from the analysis was to select independent,
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members. Khosa (2017)
confirmed this finding, reporting that independent directors play a major role to stop
unchecked discretion in an environment where agent–principal conflict exists. Another
theme that emerged was that the choice of the CEO and other senior executives are
critical to effective corporate governance. Zhang, Zhang, Jia, and Ren (2017) concurred
with this finding, stating outside directors and influential CEOs greatly influence
corporate governance and firm performance.
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The third theme is that cooperation, rather than strict monitoring, is the key to
sustainable growth. The decade starting in 2010 is often referred to as the shareholder
spring, when a number of corporations, principally in the United States and United
Kingdom found themselves at the receiving end of shareholder ire following the passing
of the Dodd-Frank law (Subramanian, 2017). Congress created the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to rein in financial malfeasance; however,
congress is rolling is back this legislation with the introduction of the Financial Choice
Act (Fraser, 2017).
The fourth theme is to promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board
membership criteria. Studies in the field of decision making have found that personal
ethical values or value orientations relate to ethical or unethical behavior in business
(Grant & McGhee, 2017). Liborius (2017) confirmed this finding, reporting that
leadership integrity refers to the consistency of a leader’s words and actions, which
includes reliable, honest, and promise-keeping behavior and has significant outcomes for
the organization in terms of performance, trust, satisfaction. Van Esterik-Plasmeijer and
van Raaij (2017) concurred with this finding, stating trust in banks and other financial
institutions are crucial for the functioning of the banking system and for society at large
and major determinants of trust are value congruence and integrity.
Applications to Professional Practice
The findings, conclusions, and recommendations from this study may contribute
to effective corporate governance in banks and corporations. Business leaders may utilize
the results in the selection of board members and executive leaders to enhance corporate
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governance. The four themes that emerged were: (a) select independent, experienced, and
knowledgeable business leaders as board members; (b) recognize the importance of the
choice of the CEO and other senior executives; (c) acknowledge cooperation is key to
sustainable growth; and (d) promote integrity and ethics as key executive and board
membership criteria.
Banks are important as a source of finance for most businesses; consequently,
strong corporate governance remains vital to the economy (Capriglione & Casalino,
2014). The findings may help to solve the problem of corporate scandals and corporate
greed that result in economic depression. By selecting independent board members,
organizational leaders would be able to monitor the executives in firms where such
monitoring is desirable. The selection of experienced business leaders to serve as board
members is essential in enabling the board to have a good understanding of the many
issues financial institutions face (i.e., primarily specialized and emerging issues such as
cybersecurity, technology, legislation, and globalization). Experience and proven
leadership are strategic advantages in the selection of board members. It is also important
to select directors that have adequate time for their board duties. Busy and distracted
directors may be ineffective and cause corporate governance (Lin et al., 2014).
The findings may aid business leaders in revising selection criteria for the senior
executives, including the CEO, CFO and chief legal officer. These senior executives
monitor bank operations for misconduct and engage legal resources in advising the CEO
and the board on compliance issues. Business knowledge and experience are important
attributes in the selection of these executives. In addition, business leaders should use
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selection criteria that put a premium on other attributes of enduring value. The board is
the safeguard of the interests of the dispersed shareholders (Sur, Lvina, & Magnan,
2013). The executives are wholly responsible to the shareholders. When the monitoring
of executives is the prime focus of the board, the board is less effective as a partner in the
growth of the corporation. Cooperation rather than strict monitoring is the key to
sustainable growth.
The findings may be relevant to improved business practice. Ineffective corporate
governance was the primary cause of excessive managerial risk-taking in the financial
sector and the financial crisis from 2007–2009. Business leaders should make integrity
and ethics a key criterion for executive and board membership. Harp et al. (2014)
concluded that regulatory compliance, with a strong ethical orientation, can lead to the
selection of board members and executive leaders that demonstrate strong ethics and
integrity‒this leads to improved corporate governance and performance.
Implications for Social Change
Implications for social change include encouraging business leaders to adopt
board selection strategies that promote corporate governance. When board members and
executive leaders who are experienced, knowledgeable, and ethical are engaged in a
bank, the positive results are transmitted to many other businesses. A responsible hand at
the helm of banking and financial corporation’s affairs may prevent corporate fraud,
greed, and malfeasance that lead to failure, economic meltdown, and global recession.
Ineffective corporate governance are the harbingers of the type of recession that
the global economy experienced 2007 to 2009. Rather than leading to corporate failure,
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and high unemployment, the success of financial institutions could promote the wellbeing of many. The positive performance may result promote improved individual
welfare and living standards for all corporate stakeholders. Effective corporate
governance strategies may lead to protection of all stakeholders, including shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, and society as a whole (Bistrova et al., 2014).
Recommendations for Action
Business leaders may consider utilizing corporate governance in strategy
formulation and execution by implementing the strategies discussed in the emerging
themes of the study. When selecting board members, it is important to consider many
factors. Volonte (2015) stated that corporate governance is crucial to financial
performance. Ineffective corporate governance is a result of weak oversight (Dymski et
al., 2013). To counter this, business leaders should select independent, experienced, and
knowledgeable directors as board members. Directors have responsibilities to
shareholders who have entrusted them to maximize their returns from their investments
(Bilchitz & Jonas, 2016).
Equally important is the selection criteria and choice of CEO and other senior
executives. The executives are responsible for enhancing shareholder value and have
responsibilities to their employees and customers as well. The knowledge and experience
of the CEO and board members are intended to promote governance (Yuan et al., 2014).
Business leaders should include governance consideration in their selection of executive
leaders. Business leaders should ascertain that long-term and sustainable objectives are
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the focus and to ensure alignment of goals and objectives from the start. It will also help
if executive remuneration and evaluation are designed to align with shareholder interests.
A recommendation is to utilize an incentive contract. An incentive contract is
when a corporation attaches performance targets to equity grants (such as stock options)
to strengthen the association between executive compensation and firm performance
(Abernethy et al., 2015). This compensation method may help to further align
shareholder interests with executive focus. In organizations with minimal agency
problem, cooperation rather than strict monitoring is the key to sustainable growth. As
recommended by Warren Buffett, performance should be the basis for executive pay and
incentives (Bowen et al., 2014).
Decision-making by directors should not only focus on short-term financial
results but also the importance of building longer-term relationships and involves striking
a balance between the competing interests of different stakeholders to benefit the
shareholders in the long term (Bilchitz & Jonas, 2016). Business leaders should make
integrity a key executive and board membership criterion. A greater emphasis on ethics is
needed to enhance corporate governance practice (Grant & McGhee, 2017).
Business leaders should be encouraged to pay attention to the results of this study.
I will continue research on related topics. I will publish excerpts from this study and write
articles for publication in professional journals on effective corporate governance. I may
also present the results from this study as best practice in corporate training, conferences
and at seminars.
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Recommendations for Further Research
In Section 1, I noted that a limitation of this study was the honesty of the
participants in discussing the board selection criteria of their bank. I mitigated this
limitation by asking open-ended questions. Open-ended research questions facilitate the
gathering comprehensive responses (Starr, 2014). I also allowed participants to answer
without interruption and asked the same interview and follow-up questions. In future
research, reproducing the study with other banks and other financial institutions may
support the results or add to the knowledge obtained from this study.
Another limitation identified was the degree of forthrightness and candor of my
participants in identifying and discussing all the effective corporate governance practices
and strategies that have been critical to preventing corporate crises and resulting in the
success of the bank. I mitigated this by engaging in telephone interviews. According to
Lord et al., (2016) telephone interviews promote forthrightness. Future researchers
should consider reproducing the study with a larger sample size to increase the
probability of complete forthrightness and candor.
Another limitation that I identified was that banks were different in size and
market capitalization and that the bank I had selected may not be representative of most
banks. To mitigate this, I chose a medium-sized bank for my single case study. Future
researchers should consider reproducing the study with both larger and smaller banks and
other financial institutions.
Exploring the strategies that banking leaders use to identify board selection
criteria to ensure effective governance led to the emergence of some themes that future
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researchers may pursue. I designed the study to focus on one medium-sized bank, which
is not representative of all types of banks. Future researchers may wish to undertake
similar studies in small and large banks. In addition, future researchers may resist
yielding to assumptions in undertaking their research. One assumption of this study was
that bank boards are critical to effective corporate governance. It may be prudent to ask
what the leaders find important toward effective corporate governance.
It would be worthwhile to undertake additional research on the utility of engaging
full-time board members. Directors are important as checks and balances and uphold
shareholder interests. Directors have the fiduciary duty of loyalty and must put the
company’s interests first. Researchers may consider exploring whether serving as a fulltime director in only one organization would improve attendance at meetings, increase
industry and firm-specific knowledge; higher engagement in the firm’s affairs may
translate to improved corporate governance and performance.
It is important to examine the effect of corporate governance in a firm with
significant agency issues when the CEO who serves on the board and is a member of the
nominating committee. Making the board of directors, their compensation, and
nominating committees more independent and accountable is important for governance
(Conyon, 2014). According to Lixiong and Masulis (2015), the composition of the
nominating committee could affect not only the composition of the entire board but also
the independence of directors, and ultimately, the quality of board oversight. The
nominating committee is responsible for new director nominations for election at the
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annual meetings, and the committee is also usually responsible for evaluating individual
director performance and approving their re-nominations (Lixiong & Masulis, 2015).
Of utmost importance is the need for future research on selection strategies for
chief executive officers. It may be beneficial to undertake further research on viable
methods and best practices to measure the integrity of prospective CEO’s and board
members. A study which examines existing methods and good practices that have been
successful in selecting strong ethical leaders with integrity could improve business
practice and performance.
Reflections
Most business entities and large segments of the population are affected by the
state of the economy, especially a severe worldwide recession that lasts for years and
leads to chronic unemployment. The questions arise as to who were those responsible,
what is the business process in which business leaders are held accountable, and what are
the criteria for selecting such leaders? If those responsible include business leaders, then
selecting the best leaders is imperative toward preventing future corporate crisis and
economic depression. There is the continuing need to study best practices when selecting
business leaders that promote and maintain effective corporate governance?
This doctoral study began as a quantitative multiple regression study. The
independent variables were (a) the independence of the board represented by the number
of outside directors; (b) gender diversity of the board, as measured by female board
members; and (c) the dual role of CEO/board chair measured by whether the CEO is also
the board chair. The dependent variable was corporate financial performance measured
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by net profit margin. A qualitative method later emerged as the best approach for this
study. The research study is of importance to most business concerns. The study was
designed to focus on effective corporate governance and the important role of directors of
corporate boards in banks. The research was designed to uncover the selection criteria
that was used by a successful bank for effective corporate governance.
I was prepared to learn about and articulate factors such as the importance of
educational attainment, demographic diversity, independence, democratic director
selection methods, and so on, but was surprised to discover that the most important
determinant of corporate governance was the choice of an experienced, knowledgeable,
and ethical CEO with integrity. I have a greater appreciation that effective corporate
governance is achievable when the enduring interests of shareholders, board members,
and senior executives are aligned, and the appropriate strategies are designed and
executed.
Conclusion
Effective corporate governance is essential to banks and businesses. For effective
corporate governance, firms must ensure that the interests of the shareholders and the
executives are aligned and minimize agency issues. The agency issues in different banks
and corporations are not the same. While some corporations may experience significant
difference and misalignment in the motivations of the CEO and shareholders, others may
not have significant agency issues. In some organizations, board members capable of
effective monitoring are desirable. In the other organizations, monitoring is not the
primary focus, but cooperation is the key to sustainable growth.
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Four themes emerged from this study. The themes were (a) select independent,
experienced, and knowledgeable business leaders as board members; recognize the
importance of the choice of the CEO and other senior executives; acknowledge
cooperation is key to sustainable growth; and promote integrity and ethics as key
executive and board membership criteria. The findings may aid business leaders in
formulating and executing effective corporate governance strategies.
Our social well-being depends in part on our economic well-being. Our nation’s
economic well-being and corporate success is a determinant of how our government may
fulfill its many obligations and our prosperity. Our prosperity hinges upon sustainable
practices of businesses and their performance and is reliant on effective corporate
governance. Identifying and proposing board member selection criteria may improve
corporate governance, which could result in better business practices and performance.
Corporate governance that enhances longer-term shareholders and stakeholder interests
are desirable and in the interests of business professionals, employees, customers,
communities, and the economy.
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter
Dear Sir/Madam:
You are invited to take part in a research study about effective corporate
governance in United States banks. The study is in partial fulfillment of the degree of
Doctor of Business Administration by the researcher, Oladayo Ojo, a doctoral student
attending Walden University. The intent is to gather insights from some board members,
members of the nominating committee and knowledgeable executives on the overarching
research question: What strategies do banking leaders use to identify board selection
criteria to ensure effective governance?
The interview would span between 25-35 minutes and scheduled at your
convenience. The doctoral study would not feature individual or company name and used
for the research study only. I would provide you with a copy of the interview transcript to
verify the accuracy before inclusion in my research paper. This research could make a
difference by fostering business success when board members are selected for enduring
characteristics that enhance corporate governance. I would send additional information
on the background of the study, informed consent and confidentiality before the
interview. I would appreciate your response on whether you would participate, decline or
for additional information. Thank you very much.
Respectfully,
Oladayo B. Ojo
Walden University
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Date: __________________________
Interviewer: ____________________
Respondent: ____________________
1. Identify myself and set the respondent at ease.
2.

Provide background information regarding the study.

3. Explain the purpose of the study and the research question.
4. Explain the consent form: assure respondent of privacy and
confidentiality.
5.

Ask to record the interview or take notes as the respondent speaks.

6.

Ask the interview questions using assigned code P1 through P4.

7. Ask follow-up questions.
8.

Thank the interviewee.

9.

Explain member checking procedure.

10. Conclude the interview.

